
The Federalist No. 19
The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the
Union (continued)
Independent Journal
Saturday, December 8, 1787
[James Madison, with Alexander Hamilton]
To the People of the State of New York:
THE
examples of ancient confederacies, cited in my last paper, have not
exhausted the source of experimental instruction on this subject.
There are existing institutions, founded on a similar principle,
which merit particular consideration. The first which presents
itself is the Germanic body.
In the early ages of Christianity, Germany was
occupied by seven distinct nations, who had no common chief. The
Franks, one of the number, having conquered the Gauls, established
the kingdom which has taken its name from them. In the ninth century
Charlemagne, its warlike monarch, carried his victorious arms in
every direction; and Germany became a part of his vast dominions. On
the dismemberment, which took place under his sons, this part was
erected into a separate and independent empire. Charlemagne and his
immediate descendants possessed the reality, as well as the ensigns
and dignity of imperial power. But the principal vassals, whose
fiefs had become hereditary, and who composed the national diets
which Charlemagne had not abolished, gradually threw off the yoke
and advanced to sovereign jurisdiction and independence. The force
of imperial sovereignty was insufficient to restrain such powerful
dependants; or to preserve the unity and tranquillity of the empire.
The most furious private wars, accompanied with every species of
calamity, were carried on between the different princes and states.
The imperial authority, unable to maintain the public order,
declined by degrees till it was almost extinct in the anarchy, which
agitated the long interval between the death of the last emperor of
the Suabian, and the accession of the first emperor of the Austrian
lines. In the eleventh century the emperors enjoyed full
sovereignty: In the fifteenth they had little more than the symbols
and decorations of power.
Out of this feudal system, which has itself many of
the important features of a confederacy, has grown the federal
system which constitutes the Germanic empire. Its powers are vested
in a diet representing the component members of the confederacy; in
the emperor, who is the executive magistrate, with a negative on the
decrees of the diet; and in the imperial chamber and the aulic
council, two judiciary tribunals having supreme jurisdiction in
controversies which concern the empire, or which happen among its
members.
The diet possesses the general power of legislating
for the empire; of making war and peace; contracting alliances;
assessing quotas of troops and money; constructing fortresses;
regulating coin; admitting new members; and subjecting disobedient
members to the ban of the empire, by which the party is degraded
from his sovereign rights and his possessions forfeited. The members
of the confederacy are expressly restricted from entering into
compacts prejudicial to the empire; from imposing tolls and duties
on their mutual intercourse, without the consent of the emperor and
diet; from altering the value of money; from doing injustice to one
another; or from affording assistance or retreat to disturbers of
the public peace. And the ban is denounced against such as shall
violate any of these restrictions. The members of the diet, as such,
are subject in all cases to be judged by the emperor and diet, and
in their private capacities by the aulic council and imperial
chamber.
The prerogatives of the emperor are numerous. The
most important of them are: his exclusive right to make propositions
to the diet; to negative its resolutions; to name ambassadors; to
confer dignities and titles; to fill vacant electorates; to found
universities; to grant privileges not injurious to the states of the
empire; to receive and apply the public revenues; and generally to
watch over the public safety. In certain cases, the electors form a
council to him. In quality of emperor, he possesses no territory
within the empire, nor receives any revenue for his support. But his
revenue and dominions, in other qualities, constitute him one of the
most powerful princes in Europe.
From such a parade of constitutional powers, in the
representatives and head of this confederacy, the natural
supposition would be, that it must form an exception to the general
character which belongs to its kindred systems. Nothing would be
further from the reality. The fundamental principle on which it
rests, that the empire is a community of sovereigns, that the diet
is a representation of sovereigns and that the laws are addressed to
sovereigns, renders the empire a nerveless body, incapable of
regulating its own members, insecure against external dangers, and
agitated with unceasing fermentations in its own bowels.
The history of Germany is a history of wars between
the emperor and the princes and states; of wars among the princes
and states themselves; of the licentiousness of the strong, and the
oppression of the weak; of foreign intrusions, and foreign
intrigues; of requisitions of men and money disregarded, or
partially complied with; of attempts to enforce them, altogether
abortive, or attended with slaughter and desolation, involving the
innocent with the guilty; of general inbecility, confusion, and
misery.
In the sixteenth century, the emperor, with one part
of the empire on his side, was seen engaged against the other
princes and states. In one of the conflicts, the emperor himself was
put to flight, and very near being made prisoner by the elector of
Saxony. The late king of Prussia was more than once pitted against
his imperial sovereign; and commonly proved an overmatch for him.
Controversies and wars among the members themselves have been so
common, that the German annals are crowded with the bloody pages
which describe them. Previous to the peace of Westphalia, Germany
was desolated by a war of thirty years, in which the emperor, with
one half of the empire, was on one side, and Sweden, with the other
half, on the opposite side. Peace was at length negotiated, and
dictated by foreign powers; and the articles of it, to which foreign
powers are parties, made a fundamental part of the Germanic
constitution.
If the nation happens, on any emergency, to be more
united by the necessity of self-defense, its situation is still
deplorable. Military preparations must be preceded by so many
tedious discussions, arising from the jealousies, pride, separate
views, and clashing pretensions of sovereign bodies, that before the
diet can settle the arrangements, the enemy are in the field; and
before the federal troops are ready to take it, are retiring into
winter quarters.
The small body of national troops, which has been
judged necessary in time of peace, is defectively kept up, badly
paid, infected with local prejudices, and supported by irregular and
disproportionate contributions to the treasury.
The impossibility of maintaining order and
dispensing justice among these sovereign subjects, produced the
experiment of dividing the empire into nine or ten circles or
districts; of giving them an interior organization, and of charging
them with the military execution of the laws against delinquent and
contumacious members. This experiment has only served to demonstrate
more fully the radical vice of the constitution. Each circle is the
miniature picture of the deformities of this political monster. They
either fail to execute their commissions, or they do it with all the
devastation and carnage of civil war. Sometimes whole circles are
defaulters; and then they increase the mischief which they were
instituted to remedy.
We may form some judgment of this scheme of military
coercion from a sample given by Thuanus. In Donawerth, a free and
imperial city of the circle of Suabia, the Abbé de St. Croix enjoyed
certain immunities which had been reserved to him. In the exercise
of these, on some public occasions, outrages were committed on him
by the people of the city. The consequence was that the city was put
under the ban of the empire, and the Duke of Bavaria, though
director of another circle, obtained an appointment to enforce it.
He soon appeared before the city with a corps of ten thousand
troops, and finding it a fit occasion, as he had secretly intended
from the beginning, to revive an antiquated claim, on the pretext
that his ancestors had suffered the place to be dismembered from his
territory,1
he took possession of it in his own name, disarmed, and punished the
inhabitants, and reannexed the city to his domains.
It may be asked, perhaps, what has so long kept this
disjointed machine from falling entirely to pieces? The answer is
obvious: The weakness of most of the members, who are unwilling to
expose themselves to the mercy of foreign powers; the weakness of
most of the principal members, compared with the formidable powers
all around them; the vast weight and influence which the emperor
derives from his separate and heriditary dominions; and the interest
he feels in preserving a system with which his family pride is
connected, and which constitutes him the first prince in Europe; --
these causes support a feeble and precarious Union; whilst the
repellant quality, incident to the nature of sovereignty, and which
time continually strengthens, prevents any reform whatever, founded
on a proper consolidation. Nor is it to be imagined, if this
obstacle could be surmounted, that the neighboring powers would
suffer a revolution to take place which would give to the empire the
force and preeminence to which it is entitled. Foreign nations have
long considered themselves as interested in the changes made by
events in this constitution; and have, on various occasions,
betrayed their policy of perpetuating its anarchy and weakness.
If more direct examples were wanting, Poland, as a
government over local sovereigns, might not improperly be taken
notice of. Nor could any proof more striking be given of the
calamities flowing from such institutions. Equally unfit for
self-government and self-defense, it has long been at the mercy of
its powerful neighbors; who have lately had the mercy to disburden
it of one third of its people and territories.
The connection among the Swiss cantons scarcely
amounts to a confederacy; though it is sometimes cited as an
instance of the stability of such institutions.
They have no common treasury; no common troops even
in war; no common coin; no common judicatory; nor any other common
mark of sovereignty.
They are kept together by the peculiarity of their
topographical position; by their individual weakness and
insignificancy; by the fear of powerful neighbors, to one of which
they were formerly subject; by the few sources of contention among a
people of such simple and homogeneous manners; by their joint
interest in their dependent possessions; by the mutual aid they
stand in need of, for suppressing insurrections and rebellions, an
aid expressly stipulated and often required and afforded; and by the
necessity of some regular and permanent provision for accomodating
disputes among the cantons. The provision is, that the parties at
variance shall each choose four judges out of the neutral cantons,
who, in case of disagreement, choose an umpire. This tribunal, under
an oath of impartiality, pronounces definitive sentence, which all
the cantons are bound to enforce. The competency of this regulation
may be estimated by a clause in their treaty of 1683, with Victor
Amadeus of Savoy; in which he obliges himself to interpose as
mediator in disputes between the cantons, and to employ force, if
necessary, against the contumacious party.
So far as the peculiarity of their case will admit
of comparison with that of the United States, it serves to confirm
the principle intended to be established. Whatever efficacy the
union may have had in ordinary cases, it appears that the moment a
cause of difference sprang up, capable of trying its strength, it
failed. The controversies on the subject of religion, which in three
instances have kindled violent and bloody contests, may be said, in
fact, to have severed the league. The Protestant and Catholic
cantons have since had their separate diets, where all the most
important concerns are adjusted, and which have left the general
diet little other business than to take care of the common bailages.
That separation had another consequence, which
merits attention. It produced opposite alliances with foreign
powers: of Berne, at the head of the Protestant association, with
the United Provinces; and of Luzerne, at the head of the Catholic
association, with France.
PUBLIUS
1. Pfeffel, "Nouvel Abrég. Chronol.
de l'Hist., etc., d'Allemagne," says the pretext was to indemnify
himself for the expense of the expedition.
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