
The Federalist No. 30
Concerning the General Power of Taxation
New York Packet
Friday, December 28, 1787
[Alexander Hamilton]
To the People of the State of New York:
IT HAS
been already observed that the federal government ought to possess
the power of providing for the support of the national forces; in
which proposition was intended to be included the expense of raising
troops, of building and equipping fleets, and all other expenses in
any wise connected with military arrangements and operations. But
these are not the only objects to which the jurisdiction of the
Union, in respect to revenue, must necessarily be empowered to
extend. It must embrace a provision for the support of the national
civil list; for the payment of the national debts contracted, or
that may be contracted; and, in general, for all those matters which
will call for disbursements out of the national treasury. The
conclusion is, that there must be interwoven, in the frame of the
government, a general power of taxation, in one shape or another.
Money is, with propriety, considered as the vital
principle of the body politic; as that which sustains its life and
motion, and enables it to perform its most essential functions. A
complete power, therefore, to procure a regular and adequate supply
of it, as far as the resources of the community will permit, may be
regarded as an indispensable ingredient in every constitution. From
a deficiency in this particular, one of two evils must ensue; either
the people must be subjected to continual plunder, as a substitute
for a more eligible mode of supplying the public wants, or the
government must sink into a fatal atrophy, and, in a short course of
time, perish.
In the Ottoman or Turkish empire, the sovereign,
though in other respects absolute master of the lives and fortunes
of his subjects, has no right to impose a new tax. The consequence
is that he permits the bashaws or governors of provinces to pillage
the people without mercy; and, in turn, squeezes out of them the
sums of which he stands in need, to satisfy his own exigencies and
those of the state. In America, from a like cause, the government of
the Union has gradually dwindled into a state of decay, approaching
nearly to annihilation. Who can doubt, that the happiness of the
people in both countries would be promoted by competent authorities
in the proper hands, to provide the revenues which the necessities
of the public might require?
The present Confederation, feeble as it is intended
to repose in the United States, an unlimited power of providing for
the pecuniary wants of the Union. But proceeding upon an erroneous
principle, it has been done in such a manner as entirely to have
frustrated the intention. Congress, by the articles which compose
that compact (as has already been stated), are authorized to
ascertain and call for any sums of money necessary, in their
judgment, to the service of the United States; and their
requisitions, if conformable to the rule of apportionment, are in
every constitutional sense obligatory upon the States. These have no
right to question the propriety of the demand; no discretion beyond
that of devising the ways and means of furnishing the sums demanded.
But though this be strictly and truly the case; though the
assumption of such a right would be an infringement of the articles
of Union; though it may seldom or never have been avowedly claimed,
yet in practice it has been constantly exercised, and would continue
to be so, as long as the revenues of the Confederacy should remain
dependent on the intermediate agency of its members. What the
consequences of this system have been, is within the knowledge of
every man the least conversant in our public affairs, and has been
amply unfolded in different parts of these inquiries. It is this
which has chiefly contributed to reduce us to a situation, which
affords ample cause both of mortification to ourselves, and of
triumph to our enemies.
What remedy can there be for this situation, but in
a change of the system which has produced it in a change of the
fallacious and delusive system of quotas and requisitions? What
substitute can there be imagined for this ignis fatuus in
finance, but that of permitting the national government to raise its
own revenues by the ordinary methods of taxation authorized in every
well-ordered constitution of civil government? Ingenious men may
declaim with plausibility on any subject; but no human ingenuity can
point out any other expedient to rescue us from the inconveniences
and embarrassments naturally resulting from defective supplies of
the public treasury.
The more intelligent adversaries of the new
Constitution admit the force of this reasoning; but they qualify
their admission by a distinction between what they call internal
and external taxation. The former they would reserve to the
State governments; the latter, which they explain into commercial
imposts, or rather duties on imported articles, they declare
themselves willing to concede to the federal head. This distinction,
however, would violate the maxim of good sense and sound policy,
which dictates that every POWER ought to be
in proportion to its OBJECT; and would still
leave the general government in a kind of tutelage to the State
governments, inconsistent with every idea of vigor or efficiency.
Who can pretend that commercial imposts are, or would be, alone
equal to the present and future exigencies of the Union? Taking into
the account the existing debt, foreign and domestic, upon any plan
of extinguishment which a man moderately impressed with the
importance of public justice and public credit could approve, in
addition to the establishments which all parties will acknowledge to
be necessary, we could not reasonably flatter ourselves, that this
resource alone, upon the most improved scale, would even suffice for
its present necessities. Its future necessities admit not of
calculation or limitation; and upon the principle, more than once
adverted to, the power of making provision for them as they arise
ought to be equally unconfined. I believe it may be regarded as a
position warranted by the history of mankind, that, in the usual
progress of things, the necessities of a nation, in every stage of
its existence, will be found at least equal to its resources.
To say that deficiencies may be provided for by
requisitions upon the States, is on the one hand to acknowledge that
this system cannot be depended upon, and on the other hand to depend
upon it for every thing beyond a certain limit. Those who have
carefully attended to its vices and deformities as they have been
exhibited by experience or delineated in the course of these papers,
must feel invincible repugnancy to trusting the national interests
in any degree to its operation. Its inevitable tendency, whenever it
is brought into activity, must be to enfeeble the Union, and sow the
seeds of discord and contention between the federal head and its
members, and between the members themselves. Can it be expected that
the deficiencies would be better supplied in this mode than the
total wants of the Union have heretofore been supplied in the same
mode? It ought to be recollected that if less will be required from
the States, they will have proportionably less means to answer the
demand. If the opinions of those who contend for the distinction
which has been mentioned were to be received as evidence of truth,
one would be led to conclude that there was some known point in the
economy of national affairs at which it would be safe to stop and to
say: Thus far the ends of public happiness will be promoted by
supplying the wants of government, and all beyond this is unworthy
of our care or anxiety. How is it possible that a government half
supplied and always necessitous, can fulfill the purposes of its
institution, can provide for the security, advance the prosperity,
or support the reputation of the commonwealth? How can it ever
possess either energy or stability, dignity or credit, confidence at
home or respectability abroad? How can its administration be any
thing else than a succession of expedients temporizing, impotent,
disgraceful? How will it be able to avoid a frequent sacrifice of
its engagements to immediate necessity? How can it undertake or
execute any liberal or enlarged plans of public good?
Let us attend to what would be the effects of this
situation in the very first war in which we should happen to be
engaged. We will presume, for argument's sake, that the revenue
arising from the impost duties answers the purposes of a provision
for the public debt and of a peace establishment for the Union. Thus
circumstanced, a war breaks out. What would be the probable conduct
of the government in such an emergency? Taught by experience that
proper dependence could not be placed on the success of
requisitions, unable by its own authority to lay hold of fresh
resources, and urged by considerations of national danger, would it
not be driven to the expedient of diverting the funds already
appropriated from their proper objects to the defense of the State?
It is not easy to see how a step of this kind could be avoided; and
if it should be taken, it is evident that it would prove the
destruction of public credit at the very moment that it was becoming
essential to the public safety. To imagine that at such a crisis
credit might be dispensed with, would be the extreme of infatuation.
In the modern system of war, nations the most wealthy are obliged to
have recourse to large loans. A country so little opulent as ours
must feel this necessity in a much stronger degree. But who would
lend to a government that prefaced its overtures for borrowing by an
act which demonstrated that no reliance could be placed on the
steadiness of its measures for paying? The loans it might be able to
procure would be as limited in their extent as burdensome in their
conditions. They would be made upon the same principles that usurers
commonly lend to bankrupt and fraudulent debtors, with a sparing
hand and at enormous premiums.
It may perhaps be imagined that, from the scantiness
of the resources of the country, the necessity of diverting the
established funds in the case supposed would exist, though the
national government should possess an unrestrained power of
taxation. But two considerations will serve to quiet all
apprehension on this head: one is, that we are sure the resources of
the community, in their full extent, will be brought into activity
for the benefit of the Union; the other is, that whatever
deficiences there may be, can without difficulty be supplied by
loans.
The power of creating new funds upon new objects of
taxation, by its own authority, would enable the national government
to borrow as far as its necessities might require. Foreigners, as
well as the citizens of America, could then reasonably repose
confidence in its engagements; but to depend upon a government that
must itself depend upon thirteen other governments for the means of
fulfilling its contracts, when once its situation is clearly
understood, would require a degree of credulity not often to be met
with in the pecuniary transactions of mankind, and little
reconcilable with the usual sharp-sightedness of avarice.
Reflections of this kind may have trifling weight
with men who hope to see realized in America the halcyon scenes of
the poetic or fabulous age; but to those who believe we are likely
to experience a common portion of the vicissitudes and calamities
which have fallen to the lot of other nations, they must appear
entitled to serious attention. Such men must behold the actual
situation of their country with painful solicitude, and deprecate
the evils which ambition or revenge might, with too much facility,
inflict upon it.
PUBLIUS
|