
The Federalist No. 41
General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution
Independent Journal
Saturday, January 19, 1788
[James Madison]
To the People of the State of New York:
THE
Constitution proposed by the convention may be considered under two
general points of view. The FIRST relates to
the sum or quantity of power which it vests in the government,
including the restraints imposed on the States. The
SECOND, to the particular structure of the government, and
the distribution of this power among its several branches.
Under the first view of the subject, two
important questions arise: 1. Whether any part of the powers
transferred to the general government be unnecessary or improper? 2.
Whether the entire mass of them be dangerous to the portion of
jurisdiction left in the several States?
Is the aggregate power of the general government
greater than ought to have been vested in it? This is the first
question.
It cannot have escaped those who have attended with
candor to the arguments employed against the extensive powers of the
government, that the authors of them have very little considered how
far these powers were necessary means of attaining a necessary end.
They have chosen rather to dwell on the inconveniences which must be
unavoidably blended with all political advantages; and on the
possible abuses which must be incident to every power or trust, of
which a beneficial use can be made. This method of handling the
subject cannot impose on the good sense of the people of America. It
may display the subtlety of the writer; it may open a boundless
field for rhetoric and declamation; it may inflame the passions of
the unthinking, and may confirm the prejudices of the misthinking:
but cool and candid people will at once reflect, that the purest of
human blessings must have a portion of alloy in them; that the
choice must always be made, if not of the lesser evil, at least of
the GREATER, not the PERFECT,
good; and that in every political institution, a power to advance
the public happiness involves a discretion which may be misapplied
and abused. They will see, therefore, that in all cases where power
is to be conferred, the point first to be decided is, whether such a
power be necessary to the public good; as the next will be, in case
of an affirmative decision, to guard as effectually as possible
against a perversion of the power to the public detriment.
That we may form a correct judgment on this subject,
it will be proper to review the several powers conferred on the
government of the Union; and that this may be the more conveniently
done they may be reduced into different classes as they relate to
the following different objects: 1. Security against foreign danger;
2. Regulation of the intercourse with foreign nations; 3.
Maintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the States; 4.
Certain miscellaneous objects of general utility; 5. Restraint of
the States from certain injurious acts; 6. Provisions for giving due
efficacy to all these powers.
The powers falling within the first class are
those of declaring war and granting letters of marque; of providing
armies and fleets; of regulating and calling forth the militia; of
levying and borrowing money.
Security against foreign danger is one of the
primitive objects of civil society. It is an avowed and essential
object of the American Union. The powers requisite for attaining it
must be effectually confided to the federal councils.
Is the power of declaring war necessary? No man will
answer this question in the negative. It would be superfluous,
therefore, to enter into a proof of the affirmative. The existing
Confederation establishes this power in the most ample form.
Is the power of raising armies and equipping fleets
necessary? This is involved in the foregoing power. It is involved
in the power of self-defense.
But was it necessary to give an
INDEFINITE POWER of raising TROOPS, as
well as providing fleets; and of maintaining both in
PEACE, as well as in WAR?
The answer to these questions has been too far
anticipated in another place to admit an extensive discussion of
them in this place. The answer indeed seems to be so obvious and
conclusive as scarcely to justify such a discussion in any place.
With what color of propriety could the force necessary for defense
be limited by those who cannot limit the force of offense? If a
federal Constitution could chain the ambition or set bounds to the
exertions of all other nations, then indeed might it prudently chain
the discretion of its own government, and set bounds to the
exertions for its own safety.
How could a readiness for war in time of peace be
safely prohibited, unless we could prohibit, in like manner, the
preparations and establishments of every hostile nation? The means
of security can only be regulated by the means and the danger of
attack. They will, in fact, be ever determined by these rules, and
by no others. It is in vain to oppose constitutional barriers to the
impulse of self-preservation. It is worse than in vain; because it
plants in the Constitution itself necessary usurpations of power,
every precedent of which is a germ of unnecessary and multiplied
repetitions. If one nation maintains constantly a disciplined army,
ready for the service of ambition or revenge, it obliges the most
pacific nations who may be within the reach of its enterprises to
take corresponding precautions. The fifteenth century was the
unhappy epoch of military establishments in the time of peace. They
were introduced by Charles VII. of France. All Europe has followed,
or been forced into, the example. Had the example not been followed
by other nations, all Europe must long ago have worn the chains of a
universal monarch. Were every nation except France now to disband
its peace establishments, the same event might follow. The veteran
legions of Rome were an overmatch for the undisciplined valor of all
other nations and rendered her the mistress of the world.
Not the less true is it, that the liberties of Rome
proved the final victim to her military triumphs; and that the
liberties of Europe, as far as they ever existed, have, with few
exceptions, been the price of her military establishments. A
standing force, therefore, is a dangerous, at the same time that it
may be a necessary, provision. On the smallest scale it has its
inconveniences. On an extensive scale its consequences may be fatal.
On any scale it is an object of laudable circumspection and
precaution. A wise nation will combine all these considerations;
and, whilst it does not rashly preclude itself from any resource
which may become essential to its safety, will exert all its
prudence in diminishing both the necessity and the danger of
resorting to one which may be inauspicious to its liberties.
The clearest marks of this prudence are stamped on
the proposed Constitution. The Union itself, which it cements and
secures, destroys every pretext for a military establishment which
could be dangerous. America united, with a handful of troops, or
without a single soldier, exhibits a more forbidding posture to
foreign ambition than America disunited, with a hundred thousand
veterans ready for combat. It was remarked, on a former occasion,
that the want of this pretext had saved the liberties of one nation
in Europe. Being rendered by her insular situation and her maritime
resources impregnable to the armies of her neighbors, the rulers of
Great Britain have never been able, by real or artificial dangers,
to cheat the public into an extensive peace establishment. The
distance of the United States from the powerful nations of the world
gives them the same happy security. A dangerous establishment can
never be necessary or plausible, so long as they continue a united
people. But let it never, for a moment, be forgotten that they are
indebted for this advantage to the Union alone. The moment of its
dissolution will be the date of a new order of things. The fears of
the weaker, or the ambition of the stronger States, or
Confederacies, will set the same example in the New, as Charles VII.
did in the Old World. The example will be followed here from the
same motives which produced universal imitation there. Instead of
deriving from our situation the precious advantage which Great
Britain has derived from hers, the face of America will be but a
copy of that of the continent of Europe. It will present liberty
everywhere crushed between standing armies and perpetual taxes. The
fortunes of disunited America will be even more disastrous than
those of Europe. The sources of evil in the latter are confined to
her own limits. No superior powers of another quarter of the globe
intrigue among her rival nations, inflame their mutual animosities,
and render them the instruments of foreign ambition, jealousy, and
revenge. In America the miseries springing from her internal
jealousies, contentions, and wars, would form a part only of her
lot. A plentiful addition of evils would have their source in that
relation in which Europe stands to this quarter of the earth, and
which no other quarter of the earth bears to Europe.
This picture of the consequences of disunion cannot
be too highly colored, or too often exhibited. Every man who loves
peace, every man who loves his country, every man who loves liberty,
ought to have it ever before his eyes, that he may cherish in his
heart a due attachment to the Union of America, and be able to set a
due value on the means of preserving it.
Next to the effectual establishment of the Union,
the best possible precaution against danger from standing armies is
a limitation of the term for which revenue may be appropriated to
their support. This precaution the Constitution has prudently added.
I will not repeat here the observations which I flatter myself have
placed this subject in a just and satisfactory light. But it may not
be improper to take notice of an argument against this part of the
Constitution, which has been drawn from the policy and practice of
Great Britain. It is said that the continuance of an army in that
kingdom requires an annual vote of the legislature; whereas the
American Constitution has lengthened this critical period to two
years. This is the form in which the comparison is usually stated to
the public: but is it a just form? Is it a fair comparison? Does the
British Constitution restrain the parliamentary discretion to one
year? Does the American impose on the Congress appropriations for
two years? On the contrary, it cannot be unknown to the authors of
the fallacy themselves, that the British Constitution fixes no limit
whatever to the discretion of the legislature, and that the American
ties down the legislature to two years, as the longest admissible
term.
Had the argument from the British example been truly
stated, it would have stood thus: The term for which supplies may be
appropriated to the army establishment, though unlimited by the
British Constitution, has nevertheless, in practice, been limited by
parliamentary discretion to a single year. Now, if in Great Britain,
where the House of Commons is elected for seven years; where so
great a proportion of the members are elected by so small a
proportion of the people; where the electors are so corrupted by the
representatives, and the representatives so corrupted by the Crown,
the representative body can possess a power to make appropriations
to the army for an indefinite term, without desiring, or without
daring, to extend the term beyond a single year, ought not suspicion
herself to blush, in pretending that the representatives of the
United States, elected FREELY by the
WHOLE BODY of the people, every
SECOND YEAR, cannot be safely intrusted with
the discretion over such appropriations, expressly limited to the
short period of TWO YEARS?
A bad cause seldom fails to betray itself. Of this
truth, the management of the opposition to the federal government is
an unvaried exemplification. But among all the blunders which have
been committed, none is more striking than the attempt to enlist on
that side the prudent jealousy entertained by the people, of
standing armies. The attempt has awakened fully the public attention
to that important subject; and has led to investigations which must
terminate in a thorough and universal conviction, not only that the
constitution has provided the most effectual guards against danger
from that quarter, but that nothing short of a Constitution fully
adequate to the national defense and the preservation of the Union,
can save America from as many standing armies as it may be split
into States or Confederacies, and from such a progressive
augmentation, of these establishments in each, as will render them
as burdensome to the properties and ominous to the liberties of the
people, as any establishment that can become necessary, under a
united and efficient government, must be tolerable to the former and
safe to the latter.
The palpable necessity of the power to provide and
maintain a navy has protected that part of the Constitution against
a spirit of censure, which has spared few other parts. It must,
indeed, be numbered among the greatest blessings of America, that as
her Union will be the only source of her maritime strength, so this
will be a principal source of her security against danger from
abroad. In this respect our situation bears another likeness to the
insular advantage of Great Britain. The batteries most capable of
repelling foreign enterprises on our safety, are happily such as can
never be turned by a perfidious government against our liberties.
The inhabitants of the Atlantic frontier are all of
them deeply interested in this provision for naval protection, and
if they have hitherto been suffered to sleep quietly in their beds;
if their property has remained safe against the predatory spirit of
licentious adventurers; if their maritime towns have not yet been
compelled to ransom themselves from the terrors of a conflagration,
by yielding to the exactions of daring and sudden invaders, these
instances of good fortune are not to be ascribed to the capacity of
the existing government for the protection of those from whom it
claims allegiance, but to causes that are fugitive and fallacious.
If we except perhaps Virginia and Maryland, which are peculiarly
vulnerable on their eastern frontiers, no part of the Union ought to
feel more anxiety on this subject than New York. Her seacoast is
extensive. A very important district of the State is an island. The
State itself is penetrated by a large navigable river for more than
fifty leagues. The great emporium of its commerce, the great
reservoir of its wealth, lies every moment at the mercy of events,
and may almost be regarded as a hostage for ignominious compliances
with the dictates of a foreign enemy, or even with the rapacious
demands of pirates and barbarians. Should a war be the result of the
precarious situation of European affairs, and all the unruly
passions attending it be let loose on the ocean, our escape from
insults and depredations, not only on that element, but every part
of the other bordering on it, will be truly miraculous. In the
present condition of America, the States more immediately exposed to
these calamities have nothing to hope from the phantom of a general
government which now exists; and if their single resources were
equal to the task of fortifying themselves against the danger, the
object to be protected would be almost consumed by the means of
protecting them.
The power of regulating and calling forth the
militia has been already sufficiently vindicated and explained.
The power of levying and borrowing money, being the
sinew of that which is to be exerted in the national defense, is
properly thrown into the same class with it. This power, also, has
been examined already with much attention, and has, I trust, been
clearly shown to be necessary, both in the extent and form given to
it by the Constitution. I will address one additional reflection
only to those who contend that the power ought to have been
restrained to external -- taxation by which they mean, taxes on
articles imported from other countries. It cannot be doubted that
this will always be a valuable source of revenue; that for a
considerable time it must be a principal source; that at this moment
it is an essential one. But we may form very mistaken ideas on this
subject, if we do not call to mind in our calculations, that the
extent of revenue drawn from foreign commerce must vary with the
variations, both in the extent and the kind of imports; and that
these variations do not correspond with the progress of population,
which must be the general measure of the public wants. As long as
agriculture continues the sole field of labor, the importation of
manufactures must increase as the consumers multiply. As soon as
domestic manufactures are begun by the hands not called for by
agriculture, the imported manufactures will decrease as the numbers
of people increase. In a more remote stage, the imports may consist
in a considerable part of raw materials, which will be wrought into
articles for exportation, and will, therefore, require rather the
encouragement of bounties, than to be loaded with discouraging
duties. A system of government, meant for duration, ought to
contemplate these revolutions, and be able to accommodate itself to
them.
Some, who have not denied the necessity of the power
of taxation, have grounded a very fierce attack against the
Constitution, on the language in which it is defined. It has been
urged and echoed, that the power "to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common
defense and general welfare of the United States," amounts to an
unlimited commission to exercise every power which may be alleged to
be necessary for the common defense or general welfare. No stronger
proof could be given of the distress under which these writers labor
for objections, than their stooping to such a misconstruction.
Had no other enumeration or definition of the powers
of the Congress been found in the Constitution, than the general
expressions just cited, the authors of the objection might have had
some color for it; though it would have been difficult to find a
reason for so awkward a form of describing an authority to legislate
in all possible cases. A power to destroy the freedom of the press,
the trial by jury, or even to regulate the course of descents, or
the forms of conveyances, must be very singularly expressed by the
terms "to raise money for the general welfare."
But what color can the objection have, when a
specification of the objects alluded to by these general terms
immediately follows, and is not even separated by a longer pause
than a semicolon? If the different parts of the same instrument
ought to be so expounded, as to give meaning to every part which
will bear it, shall one part of the same sentence be excluded
altogether from a share in the meaning; and shall the more doubtful
and indefinite terms be retained in their full extent, and the clear
and precise expressions be denied any signification whatsoever? For
what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted,
if these and all others were meant to be included in the preceding
general power? Nothing is more natural nor common than first to use
a general phrase, and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of
particulars. But the idea of an enumeration of particulars which
neither explain nor qualify the general meaning, and can have no
other effect than to confound and mislead, is an absurdity, which,
as we are reduced to the dilemma of charging either on the authors
of the objection or on the authors of the Constitution, we must take
the liberty of supposing, had not its origin with the latter.
The objection here is the more extraordinary, as it
appears that the language used by the convention is a copy from the
articles of Confederation. The objects of the Union among the
States, as described in article third, are "their common defense,
security of their liberties, and mutual and general welfare." The
terms of article eighth are still more identical: "All charges of
war and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common
defense or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in
Congress, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury," etc. A
similar language again occurs in article ninth. Construe either of
these articles by the rules which would justify the construction put
on the new Constitution, and they vest in the existing Congress a
power to legislate in all cases whatsoever. But what would have been
thought of that assembly, if, attaching themselves to these general
expressions, and disregarding the specifications which ascertain and
limit their import, they had exercised an unlimited power of
providing for the common defense and general welfare? I appeal to
the objectors themselves, whether they would in that case have
employed the same reasoning in justification of Congress as they now
make use of against the convention. How difficult it is for error to
escape its own condemnation!
PUBLIUS
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