
The Federalist No. 48
These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No
Constitutional Control Over Each Other
New York Packet
Friday, February 1, 1788
[James Madison]
To the People of the State of New York:
IT WAS
shown in the last paper that the political apothegm there examined
does not require that the legislative, executive, and judiciary
departments should be wholly unconnected with each other. I shall
undertake, in the next place, to show that unless these departments
be so far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional
control over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim
requires, as essential to a free government, can never in practice
be duly maintained.
It is agreed on all sides, that the powers properly
belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly and
completely administered by either of the other departments. It is
equally evident, that none of them ought to possess, directly or
indirectly, an overruling influence over the others, in the
administration of their respective powers. It will not be denied,
that power is of an encroaching nature, and that it ought to be
effectually restrained from passing the limits assigned to it. After
discriminating, therefore, in theory, the several classes of power,
as they may in their nature be legislative, executive, or judiciary,
the next and most difficult task is to provide some practical
security for each, against the invasion of the others. What this
security ought to be, is the great problem to be solved.
Will it be sufficient to mark, with precision, the
boundaries of these departments, in the constitution of the
government, and to trust to these parchment barriers against the
encroaching spirit of power? This is the security which appears to
have been principally relied on by the compilers of most of the
American constitutions. But experience assures us, that the efficacy
of the provision has been greatly overrated; and that some more
adequate defense is indispensably necessary for the more feeble,
against the more powerful, members of the government. The
legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its
activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.
The founders of our republics have so much merit for
the wisdom which they have displayed, that no task can be less
pleasing than that of pointing out the errors into which they have
fallen. A respect for truth, however, obliges us to remark, that
they seem never for a moment to have turned their eyes from the
danger to liberty from the overgrown and all-grasping prerogative of
an hereditary magistrate, supported and fortified by an hereditary
branch of the legislative authority. They seem never to have
recollected the danger from legislative usurpations, which, by
assembling all power in the same hands, must lead to the same
tyranny as is threatened by executive usurpations.
In a government where numerous and extensive
prerogatives are placed in the hands of an hereditary monarch, the
executive department is very justly regarded as the source of
danger, and watched with all the jealousy which a zeal for liberty
ought to inspire. In a democracy, where a multitude of people
exercise in person the legislative functions, and are continually
exposed, by their incapacity for regular deliberation and concerted
measures, to the ambitious intrigues of their executive magistrates,
tyranny may well be apprehended, on some favorable emergency, to
start up in the same quarter. But in a representative republic,
where the executive magistracy is carefully limited; both in the
extent and the duration of its power; and where the legislative
power is exercised by an assembly, which is inspired, by a supposed
influence over the people, with an intrepid confidence in its own
strength; which is sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions
which actuate a multitude, yet not so numerous as to be incapable of
pursuing the objects of its passions, by means which reason
prescribes; it is against the enterprising ambition of this
department that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and
exhaust all their precautions.
The legislative department derives a superiority in
our governments from other circumstances. Its constitutional powers
being at once more extensive, and less susceptible of precise
limits, it can, with the greater facility, mask, under complicated
and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on the
co-ordinate departments. It is not unfrequently a question of real
nicety in legislative bodies, whether the operation of a particular
measure will, or will not, extend beyond the legislative sphere. On
the other side, the executive power being restrained within a
narrower compass, and being more simple in its nature, and the
judiciary being described by landmarks still less uncertain,
projects of usurpation by either of these departments would
immediately betray and defeat themselves. Nor is this all: as the
legislative department alone has access to the pockets of the
people, and has in some constitutions full discretion, and in all a
prevailing influence, over the pecuniary rewards of those who fill
the other departments, a dependence is thus created in the latter,
which gives still greater facility to encroachments of the former.
I have appealed to our own experience for the truth
of what I advance on this subject. Were it necessary to verify this
experience by particular proofs, they might be multiplied without
end. I might find a witness in every citizen who has shared in, or
been attentive to, the course of public administrations. I might
collect vouchers in abundance from the records and archives of every
State in the Union. But as a more concise, and at the same time
equally satisfactory, evidence, I will refer to the example of two
States, attested by two unexceptionable authorities.
The first example is that of Virginia, a State
which, as we have seen, has expressly declared in its constitution,
that the three great departments ought not to be intermixed. The
authority in support of it is Mr. Jefferson, who, besides his other
advantages for remarking the operation of the government, was
himself the chief magistrate of it. In order to convey fully the
ideas with which his experience had impressed him on this subject,
it will be necessary to quote a passage of some length from his very
interesting Notes on the State of Virginia, p. 195. "All the
powers of government, legislative, executive, and judiciary, result
to the legislative body. The concentrating these in the same hands,
is precisely the definition of despotic government. It will be no
alleviation, that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of
hands, and not by a single one. One hundred and seventy-three
despots would surely be as oppressive as one. Let those who doubt
it, turn their eyes on the republic of Venice. As little will it
avail us, that they are chosen by ourselves. An elective
despotism was not the government we fought for; but one which
should not only be founded on free principles, but in which the
powers of government should be so divided and balanced among several
bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal
limits, without being effectually checked and restrained by the
others. For this reason, that convention which passed the ordinance
of government, laid its foundation on this basis, that the
legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be separate
and distinct, so that no person should exercise the powers of more
than one of them at the same time. But no barrier was provided
between these several powers. The judiciary and the executive
members were left dependent on the legislative for their subsistence
in office, and some of them for their continuance in it. If,
therefore, the legislature assumes executive and judiciary powers,
no opposition is likely to be made; nor, if made, can be effectual;
because in that case they may put their proceedings into the form of
acts of Assembly, which will render them obligatory on the other
branches. They have accordingly, in many instances,
decided rights which should have been left to judiciary
controversy, and the direction of the executive, during the
whole time of their session, is becoming habitual and familiar."
The other State which I shall take for an example is
Pennsylvania; and the other authority, the Council of Censors, which
assembled in the years 1783 and 1784. A part of the duty of this
body, as marked out by the constitution, was "to inquire whether the
constitution had been preserved inviolate in every part; and whether
the legislative and executive branches of government had performed
their duty as guardians of the people, or assumed to themselves, or
exercised, other or greater powers than they are entitled to by the
constitution. " In the execution of this trust, the council were
necessarily led to a comparison of both the legislative and
executive proceedings, with the constitutional powers of these
departments; and from the facts enumerated, and to the truth of most
of which both sides in the council subscribed, it appears that the
constitution had been flagrantly violated by the legislature in a
variety of important instances.
A great number of laws had been passed, violating,
without any apparent necessity, the rule requiring that all bills of
a public nature shall be previously printed for the consideration of
the people; although this is one of the precautions chiefly relied
on by the constitution against improper acts of legislature.
The constitutional trial by jury had been violated,
and powers assumed which had not been delegated by the constitution.
Executive powers had been usurped.
The salaries of the judges, which the constitution
expressly requires to be fixed, had been occasionally varied; and
cases belonging to the judiciary department frequently drawn within
legislative cognizance and determination.
Those who wish to see the several particulars
falling under each of these heads, may consult the journals of the
council, which are in print. Some of them, it will be found, may be
imputable to peculiar circumstances connected with the war; but the
greater part of them may be considered as the spontaneous shoots of
an ill-constituted government.
It appears, also, that the executive department had
not been innocent of frequent breaches of the constitution. There
are three observations, however, which ought to be made on this
head: first, a great proportion of the instances were either
immediately produced by the necessities of the war, or recommended
by Congress or the commander-in-chief; second, in most of the
other instances, they conformed either to the declared or the known
sentiments of the legislative department; third, the
executive department of Pennsylvania is distinguished from that of
the other States by the number of members composing it. In this
respect, it has as much affinity to a legislative assembly as to an
executive council. And being at once exempt from the restraint of an
individual responsibility for the acts of the body, and deriving
confidence from mutual example and joint influence, unauthorized
measures would, of course, be more freely hazarded, than where the
executive department is administered by a single hand, or by a few
hands.
The conclusion which I am warranted in drawing from
these observations is, that a mere demarcation on parchment of the
constitutional limits of the several departments, is not a
sufficient guard against those encroachments which lead to a
tyrannical concentration of all the powers of government in the same
hands.
PUBLIUS
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