
The Federalist No. 5
Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (continued)
Independent Journal
Saturday, November 10, 1787
[John Jay ]
To the People of the State of New York:
QUEEN ANNE,
in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch Parliament, makes
some observations on the importance of the Union then forming
between England and Scotland, which merit our attention. I shall
present the public with one or two extracts from it: "An entire and
perfect union will be the solid foundation of lasting peace: It will
secure your religion, liberty, and property; remove the animosities
amongst yourselves, and the jealousies and differences betwixt our
two kingdoms. It must increase your strength, riches, and trade; and
by this union the whole island, being joined in affection and free
from all apprehensions of different interest, will be enabled to
resist all its enemies." "We most earnestly recommend to you
calmness and unanimity in this great and weighty affair, that the
union may be brought to a happy conclusion, being the only
effectual way to secure our present and future happiness, and
disappoint the designs of our and your enemies, who will doubtless,
on this occasion, use their utmost endeavors to prevent or delay
this union."
It was remarked in the preceding paper, that
weakness and divisions at home would invite dangers from abroad; and
that nothing would tend more to secure us from them than union,
strength, and good government within ourselves. This subject is
copious and cannot easily be exhausted.
The history of Great Britain is the one with which
we are in general the best acquainted, and it gives us many useful
lessons. We may profit by their experience without paying the price
which it cost them. Although it seems obvious to common sense that
the people of such an island should be but one nation, yet we find
that they were for ages divided into three, and that those three
were almost constantly embroiled in quarrels and wars with one
another. Notwithstanding their true interest with respect to the
continental nations was really the same, yet by the arts and policy
and practices of those nations, their mutual jealousies were
perpetually kept inflamed, and for a long series of years they were
far more inconvenient and troublesome than they were useful and
assisting to each other.
Should the people of America divide themselves into
three or four nations, would not the same thing happen? Would not
similar jealousies arise, and be in like manner cherished? Instead
of their being "joined in affection" and free from all apprehension
of different interests," envy and jealousy would soon extinguish
confidence and affection, and the partial interests of each
confederacy, instead of the general interests of all America, would
be the only objects of their policy and pursuits. Hence, like most
other bordering nations, they would always be either involved
in disputes and war, or live in the constant apprehension of them.
The most sanguine advocates for three or four
confederacies cannot reasonably suppose that they would long remain
exactly on an equal footing in point of strength, even if it was
possible to form them so at first; but, admitting that to be
practicable, yet what human contrivance can secure the continuance
of such equality? Independent of those local circumstances which
tend to beget and increase power in one part and to impede its
progress in another, we must advert to the effects of that superior
policy and good management which would probably distinguish the
government of one above the rest, and by which their relative
equality in strength and consideration would be destroyed. For it
cannot be presumed that the same degree of sound policy, prudence,
and foresight would uniformly be observed by each of these
confederacies for a long succession of years.
Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen,
and happen it would, that any one of these nations or confederacies
should rise on the scale of political importance much above the
degree of her neighbors, that moment would those neighbors behold
her with envy and with fear. Both those passions would lead them to
countenance, if not to promote, whatever might promise to diminish
her importance; and would also restrain them from measures
calculated to advance or even to secure her prosperity. Much time
would not be necessary to enable her to discern these unfriendly
dispositions. She would soon begin, not only to lose confidence in
her neighbors, but also to feel a disposition equally unfavorable to
them. Distrust naturally creates distrust, and by nothing is
good-will and kind conduct more speedily changed than by invidious
jealousies and uncandid imputations, whether expressed or implied.
The North is generally the region of strength, and
many local circumstances render it probable that the most Northern
of the proposed confederacies would, at a period not very distant,
be unquestionably more formidable than any of the others. No sooner
would this become evident than the Northern Hive would excite
the same ideas and sensations in the more southern parts of America
which it formerly did in the southern parts of Europe. Nor does it
appear to be a rash conjecture that its young swarms might often be
tempted to gather honey in the more blooming fields and milder air
of their luxurious and more delicate neighbors.
They who well consider the history of similar
divisions and confederacies will find abundant reason to apprehend
that those in contemplation would in no other sense be neighbors
than as they would be borderers; that they would neither love nor
trust one another, but on the contrary would be a prey to discord,
jealousy, and mutual injuries; in short, that they would place us
exactly in the situations in which some nations doubtless wish to
see us, viz., formidable only to each other.
From these considerations it appears that those
gentlemen are greatly mistaken who suppose that alliances offensive
and defensive might be formed between these confederacies, and would
produce that combination and union of wills of arms and of
resources, which would be necessary to put and keep them in a
formidable state of defense against foreign enemies.
When did the independent states, into which Britain
and Spain were formerly divided, combine in such alliance, or unite
their forces against a foreign enemy? The proposed confederacies
will be distinct nations. Each of them would have its
commerce with foreigners to regulate by distinct treaties; and as
their productions and commodities are different and proper for
different markets, so would those treaties be essentially different.
Different commercial concerns must create different interests, and
of course different degrees of political attachment to and
connection with different foreign nations. Hence it might and
probably would happen that the foreign nation with whom the
Southern confederacy might be at war would be the one with whom
the Northern confederacy would be the most desirous of
preserving peace and friendship. An alliance so contrary to their
immediate interest would not therefore be easy to form, nor, if
formed, would it be observed and fulfilled with perfect good faith.
Nay, it is far more probable that in America, as in
Europe, neighboring nations, acting under the impulse of opposite
interests and unfriendly passions, would frequently be found taking
different sides. Considering our distance from Europe, it would be
more natural for these confederacies to apprehend danger from one
another than from distant nations, and therefore that each of them
should be more desirous to guard against the others by the aid of
foreign alliances, than to guard against foreign dangers by
alliances between themselves. And here let us not forget how much
more easy it is to receive foreign fleets into our ports, and
foreign armies into our country, than it is to persuade or compel
them to depart. How many conquests did the Romans and others make in
the characters of allies, and what innovations did they under the
same character introduce into the governments of those whom they
pretended to protect.
Let candid men judge, then, whether the division of
America into any given number of independent sovereignties would
tend to secure us against the hostilities and improper interference
of foreign nations.
PUBLIUS
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