
The Federalist No. 50
Periodical Appeals to the People Considered
New York Packet
Tuesday, February 5, 1788
[James Madison]
To the People of the State of New York:
IT MAY
be contended, perhaps, that instead of occasional appeals to
the people, which are liable to the objections urged against them,
periodical appeals are the proper and adequate means of
preventing and correcting infractions of the Constitution.
It will be attended to, that in the examination of
these expedients, I confine myself to their aptitude for
enforcing the Constitution, by keeping the several departments
of power within their due bounds, without particularly considering
them as provisions for altering the Constitution itself. In
the first view, appeals to the people at fixed periods appear to be
nearly as ineligible as appeals on particular occasions as they
emerge. If the periods be separated by short intervals, the measures
to be reviewed and rectified will have been of recent date, and will
be connected with all the circumstances which tend to vitiate and
pervert the result of occasional revisions. If the periods be
distant from each other, the same remark will be applicable to all
recent measures; and in proportion as the remoteness of the others
may favor a dispassionate review of them, this advantage is
inseparable from inconveniences which seem to counterbalance it. In
the first place, a distant prospect of public censure would be a
very feeble restraint on power from those excesses to which it might
be urged by the force of present motives. Is it to be imagined that
a legislative assembly, consisting of a hundred or two hundred
members, eagerly bent on some favorite object, and breaking through
the restraints of the Constitution in pursuit of it, would be
arrested in their career, by considerations drawn from a censorial
revision of their conduct at the future distance of ten, fifteen, or
twenty years? In the next place, the abuses would often have
completed their mischievous effects before the remedial provision
would be applied. And in the last place, where this might not be the
case, they would be of long standing, would have taken deep root,
and would not easily be extirpated.
The scheme of revising the constitution, in order to
correct recent breaches of it, as well as for other purposes, has
been actually tried in one of the States. One of the objects of the
Council of Censors which met in Pennsylvania in 1783 and 1784, was,
as we have seen, to inquire, "whether the constitution had been
violated, and whether the legislative and executive departments had
encroached upon each other." This important and novel experiment in
politics merits, in several points of view, very particular
attention. In some of them it may, perhaps, as a single experiment,
made under circumstances somewhat peculiar, be thought to be not
absolutely conclusive. But as applied to the case under
consideration, it involves some facts, which I venture to remark, as
a complete and satisfactory illustration of the reasoning which I
have employed.
First. It appears, from the names of the
gentlemen who composed the council, that some, at least, of its most
active members had also been active and leading characters in the
parties which pre-existed in the State.
Second. It appears that the same active and
leading members of the council had been active and influential
members of the legislative and executive branches, within the period
to be reviewed; and even patrons or opponents of the very measures
to be thus brought to the test of the constitution. Two of the
members had been vice-presidents of the State, and several other
members of the executive council, within the seven preceding years.
One of them had been speaker, and a number of others distinguished
members, of the legislative assembly within the same period.
Third. Every page of their proceedings
witnesses the effect of all these circumstances on the temper of
their deliberations. Throughout the continuance of the council, it
was split into two fixed and violent parties. The fact is
acknowledged and lamented by themselves. Had this not been the case,
the face of their proceedings exhibits a proof equally satisfactory.
In all questions, however unimportant in themselves, or unconnected
with each other, the same names stand invariably contrasted on the
opposite columns. Every unbiased observer may infer, without danger
of mistake, and at the same time without meaning to reflect on
either party, or any individuals of either party, that,
unfortunately, passion, not reason, must have presided
over their decisions. When men exercise their reason coolly and
freely on a variety of distinct questions, they inevitably fall into
different opinions on some of them. When they are governed by a
common passion, their opinions, if they are so to be called, will be
the same.
Fourth. It is at least problematical, whether
the decisions of this body do not, in several instances, misconstrue
the limits prescribed for the legislative and executive departments,
instead of reducing and limiting them within their constitutional
places.
Fifth. I have never understood that the
decisions of the council on constitutional questions, whether
rightly or erroneously formed, have had any effect in varying the
practice founded on legislative constructions. It even appears, if I
mistake not, that in one instance the contemporary legislature
denied the constructions of the council, and actually prevailed in
the contest.
This censorial body, therefore, proves at the same
time, by its researches, the existence of the disease, and by its
example, the inefficacy of the remedy.
This conclusion cannot be invalidated by alleging
that the State in which the experiment was made was at that crisis,
and had been for a long time before, violently heated and distracted
by the rage of party. Is it to be presumed, that at any future
septennial epoch the same State will be free from parties? Is it to
be presumed that any other State, at the same or any other given
period, will be exempt from them? Such an event ought to be neither
presumed nor desired; because an extinction of parties necessarily
implies either a universal alarm for the public safety, or an
absolute extinction of liberty.
Were the precaution taken of excluding from the
assemblies elected by the people, to revise the preceding
administration of the government, all persons who should have been
concerned with the government within the given period, the
difficulties would not be obviated. The important task would
probably devolve on men, who, with inferior capacities, would in
other respects be little better qualified. Although they might not
have been personally concerned in the administration, and therefore
not immediately agents in the measures to be examined, they would
probably have been involved in the parties connected with these
measures, and have been elected under their auspices.
PUBLIUS
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