
The Federalist No. 6
Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
Independent Journal
Wednesday, November 14, 1787
[Alexander Hamilton]
To the People of the State of New York:
THE
three last numbers of this paper have been dedicated to an
enumeration of the dangers to which we should be exposed, in a state
of disunion, from the arms and arts of foreign nations. I shall now
proceed to delineate dangers of a different and, perhaps, still more
alarming kind -- those which will in all probability flow from
dissensions between the States themselves, and from domestic
factions and convulsions. These have been already in some instances
slightly anticipated; but they deserve a more particular and more
full investigation.
A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who
can seriously doubt that, if these States should either be wholly
disunited, or only united in partial confederacies, the subdivisions
into which they might be thrown would have frequent and violent
contests with each other. To presume a want of motives for such
contests as an argument against their existence, would be to forget
that men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious. To look for a
continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected
sovereignties in the same neighborhood, would be to disregard the
uniform course of human events, and to set at defiance the
accumulated experience of ages.
The causes of hostility among nations are
innumerable. There are some which have a general and almost constant
operation upon the collective bodies of society. Of this description
are the love of power or the desire of pre-eminence and dominion --
the jealousy of power, or the desire of equality and safety. There
are others which have a more circumscribed though an equally
operative influence within their spheres. Such are the rivalships
and competitions of commerce between commercial nations. And there
are others, not less numerous than either of the former, which take
their origin entirely in private passions; in the attachments,
enmities, interests, hopes, and fears of leading individuals in the
communities of which they are members. Men of this class, whether
the favorites of a king or of a people, have in too many instances
abused the confidence they possessed; and assuming the pretext of
some public motive, have not scrupled to sacrifice the national
tranquillity to personal advantage or personal gratification.
The celebrated Pericles, in compliance with the
resentment of a prostitute,1
at the expense of much of the blood and treasure of his countrymen,
attacked, vanquished, and destroyed the city of the Samnians.
The same man, stimulated by private pique against the
Megarensians,2
another nation of Greece, or to avoid a prosecution with which he
was threatened as an accomplice of a supposed theft of the statuary
Phidias,3
or to get rid of the accusations prepared to be brought against him
for dissipating the funds of the state in the purchase of
popularity,4
or from a combination of all these causes, was the primitive author
of that famous and fatal war, distinguished in the Grecian annals by
the name of the Peloponnesian war; which, after various
vicissitudes, intermissions, and renewals, terminated in the ruin of
the Athenian commonwealth.
The ambitious cardinal, who was prime minister to
Henry VIII., permitting his vanity to aspire to the triple crown,5
entertained hopes of succeeding in the acquisition of that splendid
prize by the influence of the Emperor Charles V. To secure the favor
and interest of this enterprising and powerful monarch, he
precipitated England into a war with France, contrary to the
plainest dictates of policy, and at the hazard of the safety and
independence, as well of the kingdom over which he presided by his
counsels, as of Europe in general. For if there ever was a sovereign
who bid fair to realize the project of universal monarchy, it was
the Emperor Charles V., of whose intrigues Wolsey was at once the
instrument and the dupe.
The influence which the bigotry of one female,6
the petulance of another,7
and the cabals of a third,8
had in the contemporary policy, ferments, and pacifications, of a
considerable part of Europe, are topics that have been too often
descanted upon not to be generally known.
To multiply examples of the agency of personal
considerations in the production of great national events, either
foreign or domestic, according to their direction, would be an
unnecessary waste of time. Those who have but a superficial
acquaintance with the sources from which they are to be drawn, will
themselves recollect a variety of instances; and those who have a
tolerable knowledge of human nature will not stand in need of such
lights to form their opinion either of the reality or extent of that
agency. Perhaps, however, a reference, tending to illustrate the
general principle, may with propriety be made to a case which has
lately happened among ourselves. If Shays had not been a
desperate debtor, it is much to be doubted whether Massachusetts
would have been plunged into a civil war.
But notwithstanding the concurring testimony of
experience, in this particular, there are still to be found
visionary or designing men, who stand ready to advocate the paradox
of perpetual peace between the States, though dismembered and
alienated from each other. The genius of republics (say they) is
pacific; the spirit of commerce has a tendency to soften the manners
of men, and to extinguish those inflammable humors which have so
often kindled into wars. Commercial republics, like ours, will never
be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each
other. They will be governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate
a spirit of mutual amity and concord.
Is it not (we may ask these projectors in politics)
the true interest of all nations to cultivate the same benevolent
and philosophic spirit? If this be their true interest, have they in
fact pursued it? Has it not, on the contrary, invariably been found
that momentary passions, and immediate interest, have a more active
and imperious control over human conduct than general or remote
considerations of policy, utility or justice? Have republics in
practice been less addicted to war than monarchies? Are not the
former administered by men as well as the latter? Are there
not aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires of unjust
acquisitions, that affect nations as well as kings? Are not popular
assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment,
jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities?
Is it not well known that their determinations are often governed by
a few individuals in whom they place confidence, and are, of course,
liable to be tinctured by the passions and views of those
individuals? Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change
the objects of war? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and
enterprising a passion as that of power or glory? Have there not
been as many wars founded upon commercial motives since that has
become the prevailing system of nations, as were before occasioned
by the cupidity of territory or dominion? Has not the spirit of
commerce, in many instances, administered new incentives to the
appetite, both for the one and for the other? Let experience, the
least fallible guide of human opinions, be appealed to for an answer
to these inquiries.
Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all
republics; two of them, Athens and Carthage, of the commercial kind.
Yet were they as often engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as
the neighboring monarchies of the same times. Sparta was little
better than a well-regulated camp; and Rome was never sated of
carnage and conquest.
Carthage, though a commercial republic, was the
aggressor in the very war that ended in her destruction. Hannibal
had carried her arms into the heart of Italy and to the gates of
Rome, before Scipio, in turn, gave him an overthrow in the
territories of Carthage, and made a conquest of the commonwealth.
Venice, in later times, figured more than once in
wars of ambition, till, becoming an object to the other Italian
states, Pope Julius II. found means to accomplish that formidable
league,9
which gave a deadly blow to the power and pride of this haughty
republic.
The provinces of Holland, till they were overwhelmed
in debts and taxes, took a leading and conspicuous part in the wars
of Europe. They had furious contests with England for the dominion
of the sea, and were among the most persevering and most implacable
of the opponents of Louis XIV.
In the government of Britain the representatives of
the people compose one branch of the national legislature. Commerce
has been for ages the predominant pursuit of that country. Few
nations, nevertheless, have been more frequently engaged in war; and
the wars in which that kingdom has been engaged have, in numerous
instances, proceeded from the people.
There have been, if I may so express it, almost as
many popular as royal wars. The cries of the nation and the
importunities of their representatives have, upon various occasions,
dragged their monarchs into war, or continued them in it, contrary
to their inclinations, and sometimes contrary to the real interests
of the State. In that memorable struggle for superiority between the
rival houses of Austria and Bourbon, which so long
kept Europe in a flame, it is well known that the antipathies of the
English against the French, seconding the ambition, or rather the
avarice, of a favorite leader,10
protracted the war beyond the limits marked out by sound policy, and
for a considerable time in opposition to the views of the court.
The wars of these two last-mentioned nations have in
a great measure grown out of commercial considerations, -- the
desire of supplanting and the fear of being supplanted, either in
particular branches of traffic or in the general advantages of trade
and navigation, and sometimes even the more culpable desire of
sharing in the commerce of other nations without their consent.
The last war but between Britain and Spain sprang
from the attempts of the British merchants to prosecute an illicit
trade with the Spanish main. These unjustifiable practices on their
part produced severity on the part of the Spaniards toward the
subjects of Great Britain which were not more justifiable, because
they exceeded the bounds of a just retaliation and were chargeable
with inhumanity and cruelty. Many of the English who were taken on
the Spanish coast were sent to dig in the mines of Potosi; and by
the usual progress of a spirit of resentment, the innocent were,
after a while, confounded with the guilty in indiscriminate
punishment. The complaints of the merchants kindled a violent flame
throughout the nation, which soon after broke out in the House of
Commons, and was communicated from that body to the ministry.
Letters of reprisal were granted, and a war ensued, which in its
consequences overthrew all the alliances that but twenty years
before had been formed with sanguine expectations of the most
beneficial fruits.
From this summary of what has taken place in other
countries, whose situations have borne the nearest resemblance to
our own, what reason can we have to confide in those reveries which
would seduce us into an expectation of peace and cordiality between
the members of the present confederacy, in a state of separation?
Have we not already seen enough of the fallacy and extravagance of
those idle theories which have amused us with promises of an
exemption from the imperfections, weaknesses and evils incident to
society in every shape? Is it not time to awake from the deceitful
dream of a golden age, and to adopt as a practical maxim for the
direction of our political conduct that we, as well as the other
inhabitants of the globe, are yet remote from the happy empire of
perfect wisdom and perfect virtue?
Let the point of extreme depression to which our
national dignity and credit have sunk, let the inconveniences felt
everywhere from a lax and ill administration of government, let the
revolt of a part of the State of North Carolina, the late menacing
disturbances in Pennsylvania, and the actual insurrections and
rebellions in Massachusetts, declare --!
So far is the general sense of mankind from
corresponding with the tenets of those who endeavor to lull asleep
our apprehensions of discord and hostility between the States, in
the event of disunion, that it has from long observation of the
progress of society become a sort of axiom in politics, that
vicinity or nearness of situation, constitutes nations natural
enemies. An intelligent writer expresses himself on this subject to
this effect: "NEIGHBORING NATIONS (says he)
are naturally enemies of each other unless their common weakness
forces them to league in a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC,
and their constitution prevents the differences that neighborhood
occasions, extinguishing that secret jealousy which disposes all
states to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their neighbors."11
This passage, at the same time, points out the EVIL
and suggests the REMEDY.
PUBLIUS
1. Aspasia, vide Plutarch's
Life of Pericles.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. Phidias was supposed
to have stolen some public gold, with the connivance of Pericles,
for the embellishment of the statue of Minerva.
5. Worn by the popes.
6. Madame de Maintenon.
7. Duchess of Marlborough.
8. Madame de Pompadour.
9. The League of Cambray,
comprehending the Emperor, the King of France, the King of Aragon,
and most of the Italian princes and states.
10. The Duke of Marlborough.
11. Vide Principes des
Negociations par l'Abbé de Mably.
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