
The Federalist No. 64
The Powers of the Senate
Independent Journal
Wednesday, March 5, 1788
[John Jay]
To the People of the State of New York:
IT IS
a just and not a new observation, that enemies to particular
persons, and opponents to particular measures, seldom confine their
censures to such things only in either as are worthy of blame.
Unless on this principle, it is difficult to explain the motives of
their conduct, who condemn the proposed Constitution in the
aggregate, and treat with severity some of the most unexceptionable
articles in it.
The second section gives power to the President, "by
and with the advice and consent of the senate, to make treaties,
PROVIDED TWO THIRDS OF THE SENATORS PRESENT CONCUR."
The power of making treaties is an important one,
especially as it relates to war, peace, and commerce; and it should
not be delegated but in such a mode, and with such precautions, as
will afford the highest security that it will be exercised by men
the best qualified for the purpose, and in the manner most conducive
to the public good. The convention appears to have been attentive to
both these points: they have directed the President to be chosen by
select bodies of electors, to be deputed by the people for that
express purpose; and they have committed the appointment of senators
to the State legislatures. This mode has, in such cases, vastly the
advantage of elections by the people in their collective capacity,
where the activity of party zeal, taking the advantage of the
supineness, the ignorance, and the hopes and fears of the unwary and
interested, often places men in office by the votes of a small
proportion of the electors.
As the select assemblies for choosing the President,
as well as the State legislatures who appoint the senators, will in
general be composed of the most enlightened and respectable
citizens, there is reason to presume that their attention and their
votes will be directed to those men only who have become the most
distinguished by their abilities and virtue, and in whom the people
perceive just grounds for confidence. The Constitution manifests
very particular attention to this object. By excluding men under
thirty-five from the first office, and those under thirty from the
second, it confines the electors to men of whom the people have had
time to form a judgment, and with respect to whom they will not be
liable to be deceived by those brilliant appearances of genius and
patriotism, which, like transient meteors, sometimes mislead as well
as dazzle. If the observation be well founded, that wise kings will
always be served by able ministers, it is fair to argue, that as an
assembly of select electors possess, in a greater degree than kings,
the means of extensive and accurate information relative to men and
characters, so will their appointments bear at least equal marks of
discretion and discernment. The inference which naturally results
from these considerations is this, that the President and senators
so chosen will always be of the number of those who best understand
our national interests, whether considered in relation to the
several States or to foreign nations, who are best able to promote
those interests, and whose reputation for integrity inspires and
merits confidence. With such men the power of making treaties may be
safely lodged.
Although the absolute necessity of system, in the
conduct of any business, is universally known and acknowledged, yet
the high importance of it in national affairs has not yet become
sufficiently impressed on the public mind. They who wish to commit
the power under consideration to a popular assembly, composed of
members constantly coming and going in quick succession, seem not to
recollect that such a body must necessarily be inadequate to the
attainment of those great objects, which require to be steadily
contemplated in all their relations and circumstances, and which can
only be approached and achieved by measures which not only talents,
but also exact information, and often much time, are necessary to
concert and to execute. It was wise, therefore, in the convention to
provide, not only that the power of making treaties should be
committed to able and honest men, but also that they should continue
in place a sufficient time to become perfectly acquainted with our
national concerns, and to form and introduce a a system for the
management of them. The duration prescribed is such as will give
them an opportunity of greatly extending their political
information, and of rendering their accumulating experience more and
more beneficial to their country. Nor has the convention discovered
less prudence in providing for the frequent elections of senators in
such a way as to obviate the inconvenience of periodically
transferring those great affairs entirely to new men; for by leaving
a considerable residue of the old ones in place, uniformity and
order, as well as a constant succession of official information will
be preserved.
There are a few who will not admit that the affairs
of trade and navigation should be regulated by a system cautiously
formed and steadily pursued; and that both our treaties and our laws
should correspond with and be made to promote it. It is of much
consequence that this correspondence and conformity be carefully
maintained; and they who assent to the truth of this position will
see and confess that it is well provided for by making concurrence
of the Senate necessary both to treaties and to laws.
It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of
whatever nature, but that perfect secrecy and immediate
despatch are sometimes requisite. These are cases where the most
useful intelligence may be obtained, if the persons possessing it
can be relieved from apprehensions of discovery. Those apprehensions
will operate on those persons whether they are actuated by mercenary
or friendly motives; and there doubtless are many of both
descriptions, who would rely on the secrecy of the President, but
who would not confide in that of the Senate, and still less in that
of a large popular Assembly. The convention have done well,
therefore, in so disposing of the power of making treaties, that
although the President must, in forming them, act by the advice and
consent of the Senate, yet he will be able to manage the business of
intelligence in such a manner as prudence may suggest.
They who have turned their attention to the affairs
of men, must have perceived that there are tides in them; tides very
irregular in their duration, strength, and direction, and seldom
found to run twice exactly in the same manner or measure. To discern
and to profit by these tides in national affairs is the business of
those who preside over them; and they who have had much experience
on this head inform us, that there frequently are occasions when
days, nay, even when hours, are precious. The loss of a battle, the
death of a prince, the removal of a minister, or other circumstances
intervening to change the present posture and aspect of affairs, may
turn the most favorable tide into a course opposite to our wishes.
As in the field, so in the cabinet, there are moments to be seized
as they pass, and they who preside in either should be left in
capacity to improve them. So often and so essentially have we
heretofore suffered from the want of secrecy and despatch, that the
Constitution would have been inexcusably defective, if no attention
had been paid to those objects. Those matters which in negotiations
usually require the most secrecy and the most despatch, are those
preparatory and auxiliary measures which are not otherwise important
in a national view, than as they tend to facilitate the attainment
of the objects of the negotiation. For these, the President will
find no difficulty to provide; and should any circumstance occur
which requires the advice and consent of the Senate, he may at any
time convene them. Thus we see that the Constitution provides that
our negotiations for treaties shall have every advantage which can
be derived from talents, information, integrity, and deliberate
investigations, on the one hand, and from secrecy and despatch on
the other.
But to this plan, as to most others that have ever
appeared, objections are contrived and urged.
Some are displeased with it, not on account of any
errors or defects in it, but because, as the treaties, when made,
are to have the force of laws, they should be made only by men
invested with legislative authority. These gentlemen seem not to
consider that the judgments of our courts, and the commissions
constitutionally given by our governor, are as valid and as binding
on all persons whom they concern, as the laws passed by our
legislature. All constitutional acts of power, whether in the
executive or in the judicial department, have as much legal validity
and obligation as if they proceeded from the legislature; and
therefore, whatever name be given to the power of making treaties,
or however obligatory they may be when made, certain it is, that the
people may, with much propriety, commit the power to a distinct body
from the legislature, the executive, or the judicial. It surely does
not follow, that because they have given the power of making laws to
the legislature, that therefore they should likewise give them the
power to do every other act of sovereignty by which the citizens are
to be bound and affected.
Others, though content that treaties should be made
in the mode proposed, are averse to their being the supreme
laws of the land. They insist, and profess to believe, that treaties
like acts of assembly, should be repealable at pleasure. This idea
seems to be new and peculiar to this country, but new errors, as
well as new truths, often appear. These gentlemen would do well to
reflect that a treaty is only another name for a bargain, and that
it would be impossible to find a nation who would make any bargain
with us, which should be binding on them absolutely, but on
us only so long and so far as we may think proper to be bound by it.
They who make laws may, without doubt, amend or repeal them; and it
will not be disputed that they who make treaties may alter or cancel
them; but still let us not forget that treaties are made, not by
only one of the contracting parties, but by both; and consequently,
that as the consent of both was essential to their formation at
first, so must it ever afterwards be to alter or cancel them. The
proposed Constitution, therefore, has not in the least extended the
obligation of treaties. They are just as binding, and just as far
beyond the lawful reach of legislative acts now, as they will be at
any future period, or under any form of government.
However useful jealousy may be in republics, yet
when like bile in the natural, it abounds too much in the body
politic, the eyes of both become very liable to be deceived by the
delusive appearances which that malady casts on surrounding objects.
From this cause, probably, proceed the fears and apprehensions of
some, that the President and Senate may make treaties without an
equal eye to the interests of all the States. Others suspect that
two thirds will oppress the remaining third, and ask whether those
gentlemen are made sufficiently responsible for their conduct;
whether, if they act corruptly, they can be punished; and if they
make disadvantageous treaties, how are we to get rid of those
treaties?
As all the States are equally represented in the
Senate, and by men the most able and the most willing to promote the
interests of their constituents, they will all have an equal degree
of influence in that body, especially while they continue to be
careful in appointing proper persons, and to insist on their
punctual attendance. In proportion as the United States assume a
national form and a national character, so will the good of the
whole be more and more an object of attention, and the government
must be a weak one indeed, if it should forget that the good of the
whole can only be promoted by advancing the good of each of the
parts or members which compose the whole. It will not be in the
power of the President and Senate to make any treaties by which they
and their families and estates will not be equally bound and
affected with the rest of the community; and, having no private
interests distinct from that of the nation, they will be under no
temptations to neglect the latter.
As to corruption, the case is not supposable. He
must either have been very unfortunate in his intercourse with the
world, or possess a heart very susceptible of such impressions, who
can think it probable that the President and two thirds of the
Senate will ever be capable of such unworthy conduct. The idea is
too gross and too invidious to be entertained. But in such a case,
if it should ever happen, the treaty so obtained from us would, like
all other fraudulent contracts, be null and void by the law of
nations.
With respect to their responsibility, it is
difficult to conceive how it could be increased. Every consideration
that can influence the human mind, such as honor, oaths,
reputations, conscience, the love of country, and family affections
and attachments, afford security for their fidelity. In short, as
the Constitution has taken the utmost care that they shall be men of
talents and integrity, we have reason to be persuaded that the
treaties they make will be as advantageous as, all circumstances
considered, could be made; and so far as the fear of punishment and
disgrace can operate, that motive to good behavior is amply afforded
by the article on the subject of impeachments.
PUBLIUS
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