
The Federalist No. 66
Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for
Impeachments Further Considered
Independent Journal
Saturday, March 8. 1788
[Alexander Hamilton]
To the People of the State of New York:
A REVIEW
of the principal objections that have appeared against the proposed
court for the trial of impeachments, will not improbably eradicate
the remains of any unfavorable impressions which may still exist in
regard to this matter.
The first of these objections is, that the
provision in question confounds legislative and judiciary
authorities in the same body, in violation of that important and
wellestablished maxim which requires a separation between the
different departments of power. The true meaning of this maxim has
been discussed and ascertained in another place, and has been shown
to be entirely compatible with a partial intermixture of those
departments for special purposes, preserving them, in the main,
distinct and unconnected. This partial intermixture is even, in some
cases, not only proper but necessary to the mutual defense of the
several members of the government against each other. An absolute or
qualified negative in the executive upon the acts of the legislative
body, is admitted, by the ablest adepts in political science, to be
an indispensable barrier against the encroachments of the latter
upon the former. And it may, perhaps, with no less reason be
contended, that the powers relating to impeachments are, as before
intimated, an essential check in the hands of that body upon the
encroachments of the executive. The division of them between the two
branches of the legislature, assigning to one the right of accusing,
to the other the right of judging, avoids the inconvenience of
making the same persons both accusers and judges; and guards against
the danger of persecution, from the prevalency of a factious spirit
in either of those branches. As the concurrence of two thirds of the
Senate will be requisite to a condemnation, the security to
innocence, from this additional circumstance, will be as complete as
itself can desire.
It is curious to observe, with what vehemence this
part of the plan is assailed, on the principle here taken notice of,
by men who profess to admire, without exception, the constitution of
this State; while that constitution makes the Senate, together with
the chancellor and judges of the Supreme Court, not only a court of
impeachments, but the highest judicatory in the State, in all
causes, civil and criminal. The proportion, in point of numbers, of
the chancellor and judges to the senators, is so inconsiderable,
that the judiciary authority of New York, in the last resort, may,
with truth, be said to reside in its Senate. If the plan of the
convention be, in this respect, chargeable with a departure from the
celebrated maxim which has been so often mentioned, and seems to be
so little understood, how much more culpable must be the
constitution of New York?1
A second objection to the Senate, as a court
of impeachments, is, that it contributes to an undue accumulation of
power in that body, tending to give to the government a countenance
too aristocratic. The Senate, it is observed, is to have concurrent
authority with the Executive in the formation of treaties and in the
appointment to offices: if, say the objectors, to these prerogatives
is added that of deciding in all cases of impeachment, it will give
a decided predominancy to senatorial influence. To an objection so
little precise in itself, it is not easy to find a very precise
answer. Where is the measure or criterion to which we can appeal,
for determining what will give the Senate too much, too little, or
barely the proper degree of influence? Will it not be more safe, as
well as more simple, to dismiss such vague and uncertain
calculations, to examine each power by itself, and to decide, on
general principles, where it may be deposited with most advantage
and least inconvenience?
If we take this course, it will lead to a more
intelligible, if not to a more certain result. The disposition of
the power of making treaties, which has obtained in the plan of the
convention, will, then, if I mistake not, appear to be fully
justified by the considerations stated in a former number, and by
others which will occur under the next head of our inquiries. The
expediency of the junction of the Senate with the Executive, in the
power of appointing to offices, will, I trust, be placed in a light
not less satisfactory, in the disquisitions under the same head. And
I flatter myself the observations in my last paper must have gone no
inconsiderable way towards proving that it was not easy, if
practicable, to find a more fit receptacle for the power of
determining impeachments, than that which has been chosen. If this
be truly the case, the hypothetical dread of the too great weight of
the Senate ought to be discarded from our reasonings.
But this hypothesis, such as it is, has already been
refuted in the remarks applied to the duration in office prescribed
for the senators. It was by them shown, as well on the credit of
historical examples, as from the reason of the thing, that the most
popular branch of every government, partaking of the
republican genius, by being generally the favorite of the people,
will be as generally a full match, if not an overmatch, for every
other member of the Government.
But independent of this most active and operative
principle, to secure the equilibrium of the national House of
Representatives, the plan of the convention has provided in its
favor several important counterpoises to the additional authorities
to be conferred upon the Senate. The exclusive privilege of
originating money bills will belong to the House of Representatives.
The same house will possess the sole right of instituting
impeachments: is not this a complete counterbalance to that of
determining them? The same house will be the umpire in all elections
of the President, which do not unite the suffrages of a majority of
the whole number of electors; a case which it cannot be doubted will
sometimes, if not frequently, happen. The constant possibility of
the thing must be a fruitful source of influence to that body. The
more it is contemplated, the more important will appear this
ultimate though contingent power, of deciding the competitions of
the most illustrious citizens of the Union, for the first office in
it. It would not perhaps be rash to predict, that as a mean of
influence it will be found to outweigh all the peculiar attributes
of the Senate.
A third objection to the Senate as a court of
impeachments, is drawn from the agency they are to have in the
appointments to office. It is imagined that they would be too
indulgent judges of the conduct of men, in whose official creation
they had participated. The principle of this objection would condemn
a practice, which is to be seen in all the State governments, if not
in all the governments with which we are acquainted: I mean that of
rendering those who hold offices during pleasure, dependent on the
pleasure of those who appoint them. With equal plausibility might it
be alleged in this case, that the favoritism of the latter would
always be an asylum for the misbehavior of the former. But that
practice, in contradiction to this principle, proceeds upon the
presumption, that the responsibility of those who appoint, for the
fitness and competency of the persons on whom they bestow their
choice, and the interest they will have in the respectable and
prosperous administration of affairs, will inspire a sufficient
disposition to dismiss from a share in it all such who, by their
conduct, shall have proved themselves unworthy of the confidence
reposed in them. Though facts may not always correspond with this
presumption, yet if it be, in the main, just, it must destroy the
supposition that the Senate, who will merely sanction the choice of
the Executive, should feel a bias, towards the objects of that
choice, strong enough to blind them to the evidences of guilt so
extraordinary, as to have induced the representatives of the nation
to become its accusers.
If any further arguments were necessary to evince
the improbability of such a bias, it might be found in the nature of
the agency of the Senate in the business of appointments. It will be
the office of the President to nominate, and, with the advice
and consent of the Senate, to appoint. There will, of course,
be no exertion of choice on the part of the Senate. They may
defeat one choice of the Executive, and oblige him to make another;
but they cannot themselves choose -- they can only ratify or
reject the choice of the President. They might even entertain a
preference to some other person, at the very moment they were
assenting to the one proposed, because there might be no positive
ground of opposition to him; and they could not be sure, if they
withheld their assent, that the subsequent nomination would fall
upon their own favorite, or upon any other person in their
estimation more meritorious than the one rejected. Thus it could
hardly happen, that the majority of the Senate would feel any other
complacency towards the object of an appointment than such as the
appearances of merit might inspire, and the proofs of the want of it
destroy.
A fourth objection to the Senate in the
capacity of a court of impeachments, is derived from its union with
the Executive in the power of making treaties. This, it has been
said, would constitute the senators their own judges, in every case
of a corrupt or perfidious execution of that trust. After having
combined with the Executive in betraying the interests of the nation
in a ruinous treaty, what prospect, it is asked, would there be of
their being made to suffer the punishment they would deserve, when
they were themselves to decide upon the accusation brought against
them for the treachery of which they have been guilty?
This objection has been circulated with more
earnestness and with greater show of reason than any other which has
appeared against this part of the plan; and yet I am deceived if it
does not rest upon an erroneous foundation.
The security essentially intended by the
Constitution against corruption and treachery in the formation of
treaties, is to be sought for in the numbers and characters of those
who are to make them. The JOINT AGENCY of the
Chief Magistrate of the Union, and of two thirds of the members of a
body selected by the collective wisdom of the legislatures of the
several States, is designed to be the pledge for the fidelity of the
national councils in this particular. The convention might with
propriety have meditated the punishment of the Executive, for a
deviation from the instructions of the Senate, or a want of
integrity in the conduct of the negotiations committed to him; they
might also have had in view the punishment of a few leading
individuals in the Senate, who should have prostituted their
influence in that body as the mercenary instruments of foreign
corruption: but they could not, with more or with equal propriety,
have contemplated the impeachment and punishment of two thirds of
the Senate, consenting to an improper treaty, than of a majority of
that or of the other branch of the national legislature, consenting
to a pernicious or unconstitutional law -- a principle which, I
believe, has never been admitted into any government. How, in fact,
could a majority in the House of Representatives impeach themselves?
Not better, it is evident, than two thirds of the Senate might try
themselves. And yet what reason is there, that a majority of the
House of Representatives, sacrificing the interests of the society
by an unjust and tyrannical act of legislation, should escape with
impunity, more than two thirds of the Senate, sacrificing the same
interests in an injurious treaty with a foreign power? The truth is,
that in all such cases it is essential to the freedom and to the
necessary independence of the deliberations of the body, that the
members of it should be exempt from punishment for acts done in a
collective capacity; and the security to the society must depend on
the care which is taken to confide the trust to proper hands, to
make it their interest to execute it with fidelity, and to make it
as difficult as possible for them to combine in any interest
opposite to that of the public good.
So far as might concern the misbehavior of the
Executive in perverting the instructions or contravening the views
of the Senate, we need not be apprehensive of the want of a
disposition in that body to punish the abuse of their confidence or
to vindicate their own authority. We may thus far count upon their
pride, if not upon their virtue. And so far even as might concern
the corruption of leading members, by whose arts and influence the
majority may have been inveigled into measures odious to the
community, if the proofs of that corruption should be satisfactory,
the usual propensity of human nature will warrant us in concluding
that there would be commonly no defect of inclination in the body to
divert the public resentment from themselves by a ready sacrifice of
the authors of their mismanagement and disgrace.
PUBLIUS
1. In that of New Jersey, also, the
final judiciary authority is in a branch of the legislature. In New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina, one
branch of the legislature is the court for the trial of
impeachments.
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