
The Federalist No. 7
Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
(continued)
Independent Journal
Thursday, November 15, 1787
[Alexander Hamilton]
To the People of the State of New York:
IT IS
sometimes asked, with an air of seeming triumph, what inducements
could the States have, if disunited, to make war upon each other? It
would be a full answer to this question to say -- precisely the same
inducements which have, at different times, deluged in blood all the
nations in the world. But, unfortunately for us, the question admits
of a more particular answer. There are causes of differences within
our immediate contemplation, of the tendency of which, even under
the restraints of a federal constitution, we have had sufficient
experience to enable us to form a judgment of what might be expected
if those restraints were removed.
Territorial disputes have at all times been found
one of the most fertile sources of hostility among nations. Perhaps
the greatest proportion of wars that have desolated the earth have
sprung from this origin. This cause would exist among us in full
force. We have a vast tract of unsettled territory within the
boundaries of the United States. There still are discordant and
undecided claims between several of them, and the dissolution of the
Union would lay a foundation for similar claims between them all. It
is well known that they have heretofore had serious and animated
discussion concerning the rights to the lands which were ungranted
at the time of the Revolution, and which usually went under the name
of crown lands. The States within the limits of whose colonial
governments they were comprised have claimed them as their property,
the others have contended that the rights of the crown in this
article devolved upon the Union; especially as to all that part of
the Western territory which, either by actual possession, or through
the submission of the Indian proprietors, was subjected to the
jurisdiction of the king of Great Britain, till it was relinquished
in the treaty of peace. This, it has been said, was at all events an
acquisition to the Confederacy by compact with a foreign power. It
has been the prudent policy of Congress to appease this controversy,
by prevailing upon the States to make cessions to the United States
for the benefit of the whole. This has been so far accomplished as,
under a continuation of the Union, to afford a decided prospect of
an amicable termination of the dispute. A dismemberment of the
Confederacy, however, would revive this dispute, and would create
others on the same subject. At present, a large part of the vacant
Western territory is, by cession at least, if not by any anterior
right, the common property of the Union. If that were at an end, the
States which made the cession, on a principle of federal compromise,
would be apt when the motive of the grant had ceased, to reclaim the
lands as a reversion. The other States would no doubt insist on a
proportion, by right of representation. Their argument would be,
that a grant, once made, could not be revoked; and that the justice
of participating in territory acquired or secured by the joint
efforts of the Confederacy, remained undiminished. If, contrary to
probability, it should be admitted by all the States, that each had
a right to a share of this common stock, there would still be a
difficulty to be surmounted, as to a proper rule of apportionment.
Different principles would be set up by different States for this
purpose; and as they would affect the opposite interests of the
parties, they might not easily be susceptible of a pacific
adjustment.
In the wide field of Western territory, therefore,
we perceive an ample theatre for hostile pretensions, without any
umpire or common judge to interpose between the contending parties.
To reason from the past to the future, we shall have good ground to
apprehend, that the sword would sometimes be appealed to as the
arbiter of their differences. The circumstances of the dispute
between Connecticut and Pennsylvania, respecting the land at
Wyoming, admonish us not to be sanguine in expecting an easy
accommodation of such differences. The articles of confederation
obliged the parties to submit the matter to the decision of a
federal court. The submission was made, and the court decided in
favor of Pennsylvania. But Connecticut gave strong indications of
dissatisfaction with that determination; nor did she appear to be
entirely resigned to it, till, by negotiation and management,
something like an equivalent was found for the loss she supposed
herself to have sustained. Nothing here said is intended to convey
the slightest censure on the conduct of that State. She no doubt
sincerely believed herself to have been injured by the decision; and
States, like individuals, acquiesce with great reluctance in
determinations to their disadvantage.
Those who had an opportunity of seeing the inside of
the transactions which attended the progress of the controversy
between this State and the district of Vermont, can vouch the
opposition we experienced, as well from States not interested as
from those which were interested in the claim; and can attest the
danger to which the peace of the Confederacy might have been
exposed, had this State attempted to assert its rights by force. Two
motives preponderated in that opposition: one, a jealousy
entertained of our future power; and the other, the interest of
certain individuals of influence in the neighboring States, who had
obtained grants of lands under the actual government of that
district. Even the States which brought forward claims, in
contradiction to ours, seemed more solicitous to dismember this
State, than to establish their own pretensions. These were New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. New Jersey and Rhode
Island, upon all occasions, discovered a warm zeal for the
independence of Vermont; and Maryland, till alarmed by the
appearance of a connection between Canada and that State, entered
deeply into the same views. These being small States, saw with an
unfriendly eye the perspective of our growing greatness. In a review
of these transactions we may trace some of the causes which would be
likely to embroil the States with each other, if it should be their
unpropitious destiny to become disunited.
The competitions of commerce would be another
fruitful source of contention. The States less favorably
circumstanced would be desirous of escaping from the disadvantages
of local situation, and of sharing in the advantages of their more
fortunate neighbors. Each State, or separate confederacy, would
pursue a system of commercial policy peculiar to itself. This would
occasion distinctions, preferences, and exclusions, which would
beget discontent. The habits of intercourse, on the basis of equal
privileges, to which we have been accustomed since the earliest
settlement of the country, would give a keener edge to those causes
of discontent than they would naturally have independent of this
circumstance. We should be ready to denominate injuries those
things which were in reality the justifiable acts of independent
sovereignties consulting a distinct interest. The spirit of
enterprise, which characterizes the commercial part of America, has
left no occasion of displaying itself unimproved. It is not at all
probable that this unbridled spirit would pay much respect to those
regulations of trade by which particular States might endeavor to
secure exclusive benefits to their own citizens. The infractions of
these regulations, on one side, the efforts to prevent and repel
them, on the other, would naturally lead to outrages, and these to
reprisals and wars.
The opportunities which some States would have of
rendering others tributary to them by commercial regulations would
be impatiently submitted to by the tributary States. The relative
situation of New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey would afford an
example of this kind. New York, from the necessities of revenue,
must lay duties on her importations. A great part of these duties
must be paid by the inhabitants of the two other States in the
capacity of consumers of what we import. New York would neither be
willing nor able to forego this advantage. Her citizens would not
consent that a duty paid by them should be remitted in favor of the
citizens of her neighbors; nor would it be practicable, if there
were not this impediment in the way, to distinguish the customers in
our own markets. Would Connecticut and New Jersey long submit to be
taxed by New York for her exclusive benefit? Should we be long
permitted to remain in the quiet and undisturbed enjoyment of a
metropolis, from the possession of which we derived an advantage so
odious to our neighbors, and, in their opinion, so oppressive?
Should we be able to preserve it against the incumbent weight of
Connecticut on the one side, and the co-operating pressure of New
Jersey on the other? These are questions that temerity alone will
answer in the affirmative.
The public debt of the Union would be a further
cause of collision between the separate States or confederacies. The
apportionment, in the first instance, and the progressive
extinguishment afterward, would be alike productive of ill-humor and
animosity. How would it be possible to agree upon a rule of
apportionment satisfactory to all? There is scarcely any that can be
proposed which is entirely free from real objections. These, as
usual, would be exaggerated by the adverse interest of the parties.
There are even dissimilar views among the States as to the general
principle of discharging the public debt. Some of them, either less
impressed with the importance of national credit, or because their
citizens have little, if any, immediate interest in the question,
feel an indifference, if not a repugnance, to the payment of the
domestic debt at any rate. These would be inclined to magnify the
difficulties of a distribution. Others of them, a numerous body of
whose citizens are creditors to the public beyond proportion of the
State in the total amount of the national debt, would be strenuous
for some equitable and effective provision. The procrastinations of
the former would excite the resentments of the latter. The
settlement of a rule would, in the meantime, be postponed by real
differences of opinion and affected delays. The citizens of the
States interested would clamour; foreign powers would urge for the
satisfaction of their just demands, and the peace of the States
would be hazarded to the double contingency of external invasion and
internal contention.
Suppose the difficulties of agreeing upon a rule
surmounted, and the apportionment made. Still there is great room to
suppose that the rule agreed upon would, upon experiment, be found
to bear harder upon some States than upon others. Those which were
sufferers by it would naturally seek for a mitigation of the burden.
The others would as naturally be disinclined to a revision, which
was likely to end in an increase of their own incumbrances. Their
refusal would be too plausible a pretext to the complaining States
to withhold their contributions, not to be embraced with avidity;
and the non-compliance of these States with their engagements would
be a ground of bitter discussion and altercation. If even the rule
adopted should in practice justify the equality of its principle,
still delinquencies in payments on the part of some of the States
would result from a diversity of other causes -- the real deficiency
of resources; the mismanagement of their finances; accidental
disorders in the management of the government; and, in addition to
the rest, the reluctance with which men commonly part with money for
purposes that have outlived the exigencies which produced them, and
interfere with the supply of immediate wants. Delinquencies, from
whatever causes, would be productive of complaints, recriminations,
and quarrels. There is, perhaps, nothing more likely to disturb the
tranquillity of nations than their being bound to mutual
contributions for any common object that does not yield an equal and
coincident benefit. For it is an observation, as true as it is
trite, that there is nothing men differ so readily about as the
payment of money.
Laws in violation of private contracts, as they
amount to aggressions on the rights of those States whose citizens
are injured by them, may be considered as another probable source of
hostility. We are not authorized to expect that a more liberal or
more equitable spirit would preside over the legislations of the
individual States hereafter, if unrestrained by any additional
checks, than we have heretofore seen in too many instances
disgracing their several codes. We have observed the disposition to
retaliation excited in Connecticut in consequence of the enormities
perpetrated by the Legislature of Rhode Island; and we reasonably
infer that, in similar cases, under other circumstances, a war, not
of parchment, but of the sword, would chastise such atrocious
breaches of moral obligation and social justice.
The probability of incompatible alliances between
the different States or confederacies and different foreign nations,
and the effects of this situation upon the peace of the whole, have
been sufficiently unfolded in some preceding papers. From the view
they have exhibited of this part of the subject, this conclusion is
to be drawn, that America, if not connected at all, or only by the
feeble tie of a simple league, offensive and defensive, would, by
the operation of such jarring alliances, be gradually entangled in
all the pernicious labyrinths of European politics and wars; and by
the destructive contentions of the parts into which she was divided,
would be likely to become a prey to the artifices and machinations
of powers equally the enemies of them all. Divide et impera1
must be the motto of every nation that either hates or fears us.2
PUBLIUS
1. Divide and command.
2. In order that the whole subject
of these papers may as soon as possible be laid before the public,
it is proposed to publish them four times a week -- on Tuesday in
the New York Packet and on Thursday in the Daily Advertiser.
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