
The Federalist No. 85
Concluding Remarks
Independent Journal
Wednesday, August 13, Saturday, August 16, 1788
[Alexander Hamilton]
To the People of the State of New York:
ACCORDING
to the formal division of the subject of these papers, announced
in my first number, there would appear still to remain for
discussion two points: "the analogy of the proposed government
to your own State constitution," and "the additional security
which its adoption will afford to republican government, to
liberty, and to property." But these heads have been so fully
anticipated and exhausted in the progress of the work, that it
would now scarcely be possible to do any thing more than repeat,
in a more dilated form, what has been heretofore said, which the
advanced stage of the question, and the time already spent upon
it, conspire to forbid.
It is remarkable, that the resemblance of the
plan of the convention to the act which organizes the government
of this State holds, not less with regard to many of the
supposed defects, than to the real excellences of the former.
Among the pretended defects are the re-eligibility of the
Executive, the want of a council, the omission of a formal bill
of rights, the omission of a provision respecting the liberty of
the press. These and several others which have been noted in the
course of our inquiries are as much chargeable on the existing
constitution of this State, as on the one proposed for the
Union; and a man must have slender pretensions to consistency,
who can rail at the latter for imperfections which he finds no
difficulty in excusing in the former. Nor indeed can there be a
better proof of the insincerity and affectation of some of the
zealous adversaries of the plan of the convention among us, who
profess to be the devoted admirers of the government under which
they live, than the fury with which they have attacked that
plan, for matters in regard to which our own constitution is
equally or perhaps more vulnerable.
The additional securities to republican
government, to liberty and to property, to be derived from the
adoption of the plan under consideration, consist chiefly in the
restraints which the preservation of the Union will impose on
local factions and insurrections, and on the ambition of
powerful individuals in single States, who may acquire credit
and influence enough, from leaders and favorites, to become the
despots of the people; in the diminution of the opportunities to
foreign intrigue, which the dissolution of the Confederacy would
invite and facilitate; in the prevention of extensive military
establishments, which could not fail to grow out of wars between
the States in a disunited situation; in the express guaranty of
a republican form of government to each; in the absolute and
universal exclusion of titles of nobility; and in the
precautions against the repetition of those practices on the
part of the State governments which have undermined the
foundations of property and credit, have planted mutual distrust
in the breasts of all classes of citizens, and have occasioned
an almost universal prostration of morals.
Thus have I, fellow-citizens, executed the task
I had assigned to myself; with what success, your conduct must
determine. I trust at least you will admit that I have not
failed in the assurance I gave you respecting the spirit with
which my endeavors should be conducted. I have addressed myself
purely to your judgments, and have studiously avoided those
asperities which are too apt to disgrace political disputants of
all parties, and which have been not a little provoked by the
language and conduct of the opponents of the Constitution. The
charge of a conspiracy against the liberties of the people,
which has been indiscriminately brought against the advocates of
the plan, has something in it too wanton and too malignant, not
to excite the indignation of every man who feels in his own
bosom a refutation of the calumny. The perpetual changes which
have been rung upon the wealthy, the well-born, and the great,
have been such as to inspire the disgust of all sensible men.
And the unwarrantable concealments and misrepresentations which
have been in various ways practiced to keep the truth from the
public eye, have been of a nature to demand the reprobation of
all honest men. It is not impossible that these circumstances
may have occasionally betrayed me into intemperances of
expression which I did not intend; it is certain that I have
frequently felt a struggle between sensibility and moderation;
and if the former has in some instances prevailed, it must be my
excuse that it has been neither often nor much.
Let us now pause and ask ourselves whether, in
the course of these papers, the proposed Constitution has not
been satisfactorily vindicated from the aspersions thrown upon
it; and whether it has not been shown to be worthy of the public
approbation, and necessary to the public safety and prosperity.
Every man is bound to answer these questions to himself,
according to the best of his conscience and understanding, and
to act agreeably to the genuine and sober dictates of his
judgment. This is a duty from which nothing can give him a
dispensation. 'T is one that he is called upon, nay, constrained
by all the obligations that form the bands of society, to
discharge sincerely and honestly. No partial motive, no
particular interest, no pride of opinion, no temporary passion
or prejudice, will justify to himself, to his country, or to his
posterity, an improper election of the part he is to act. Let
him beware of an obstinate adherence to party; let him reflect
that the object upon which he is to decide is not a particular
interest of the community, but the very existence of the nation;
and let him remember that a majority of America has already
given its sanction to the plan which he is to approve or reject.
I shall not dissemble that I feel an entire
confidence in the arguments which recommend the proposed system
to your adoption, and that I am unable to discern any real force
in those by which it has been opposed. I am persuaded that it is
the best which our political situation, habits, and opinions
will admit, and superior to any the revolution has produced.
Concessions on the part of the friends of the
plan, that it has not a claim to absolute perfection, have
afforded matter of no small triumph to its enemies. "Why," say
they, "should we adopt an imperfect thing? Why not amend it and
make it perfect before it is irrevocably established?" This may
be plausible enough, but it is only plausible. In the first
place I remark, that the extent of these concessions has been
greatly exaggerated. They have been stated as amounting to an
admission that the plan is radically defective, and that without
material alterations the rights and the interests of the
community cannot be safely confided to it. This, as far as I
have understood the meaning of those who make the concessions,
is an entire perversion of their sense. No advocate of the
measure can be found, who will not declare as his sentiment,
that the system, though it may not be perfect in every part, is,
upon the whole, a good one; is the best that the present views
and circumstances of the country will permit; and is such an one
as promises every species of security which a reasonable people
can desire.
I answer in the next place, that I should esteem
it the extreme of imprudence to prolong the precarious state of
our national affairs, and to expose the Union to the jeopardy of
successive experiments, in the chimerical pursuit of a perfect
plan. I never expect to see a perfect work from imperfect man.
The result of the deliberations of all collective bodies must
necessarily be a compound, as well of the errors and prejudices,
as of the good sense and wisdom, of the individuals of whom they
are composed. The compacts which are to embrace thirteen
distinct States in a common bond of amity and union, must as
necessarily be a compromise of as many dissimilar interests and
inclinations. How can perfection spring from such materials?
The reasons assigned in an excellent little
pamphlet lately published in this city,1
are unanswerable to show the utter improbability of assembling a
new convention, under circumstances in any degree so favorable
to a happy issue, as those in which the late convention met,
deliberated, and concluded. I will not repeat the arguments
there used, as I presume the production itself has had an
extensive circulation. It is certainly well worthy the perusal
of every friend to his country. There is, however, one point of
light in which the subject of amendments still remains to be
considered, and in which it has not yet been exhibited to public
view. I cannot resolve to conclude without first taking a survey
of it in this aspect.
It appears to me susceptible of absolute
demonstration, that it will be far more easy to obtain
subsequent than previous amendments to the Constitution. The
moment an alteration is made in the present plan, it becomes, to
the purpose of adoption, a new one, and must undergo a new
decision of each State. To its complete establishment throughout
the Union, it will therefore require the concurrence of thirteen
States. If, on the contrary, the Constitution proposed should
once be ratified by all the States as it stands, alterations in
it may at any time be effected by nine States. Here, then, the
chances are as thirteen to nine2
in favor of subsequent amendment, rather than of the original
adoption of an entire system.
This is not all. Every Constitution for the
United States must inevitably consist of a great variety of
particulars, in which thirteen independent States are to be
accommodated in their interests or opinions of interest. We may
of course expect to see, in any body of men charged with its
original formation, very different combinations of the parts
upon different points. Many of those who form a majority on one
question, may become the minority on a second, and an
association dissimilar to either may constitute the majority on
a third. Hence the necessity of moulding and arranging all the
particulars which are to compose the whole, in such a manner as
to satisfy all the parties to the compact; and hence, also, an
immense multiplication of difficulties and casualties in
obtaining the collective assent to a final act. The degree of
that multiplication must evidently be in a ratio to the number
of particulars and the number of parties.
But every amendment to the Constitution, if once
established, would be a single proposition, and might be brought
forward singly. There would then be no necessity for management
or compromise, in relation to any other point -- no giving nor
taking. The will of the requisite number would at once bring the
matter to a decisive issue. And consequently, whenever nine, or
rather ten States, were united in the desire of a particular
amendment, that amendment must infallibly take place. There can,
therefore, be no comparison between the facility of affecting an
amendment, and that of establishing in the first instance a
complete Constitution.
In opposition to the probability of subsequent
amendments, it has been urged that the persons delegated to the
administration of the national government will always be
disinclined to yield up any portion of the authority of which
they were once possessed. For my own part I acknowledge a
thorough conviction that any amendments which may, upon mature
consideration, be thought useful, will be applicable to the
organization of the government, not to the mass of its powers;
and on this account alone, I think there is no weight in the
observation just stated. I also think there is little weight in
it on another account. The intrinsic difficulty of governing
THIRTEEN STATES at any rate, independent
of calculations upon an ordinary degree of public spirit and
integrity, will, in my opinion constantly impose on the
national rulers the necessity of a spirit of
accommodation to the reasonable expectations of their
constituents. But there is yet a further consideration, which
proves beyond the possibility of a doubt, that the observation
is futile. It is this that the national rulers, whenever nine
States concur, will have no option upon the subject. By the
fifth article of the plan, the Congres will be obliged
"on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the
States [which at present amount to nine], to call a convention
for proposing amendments, which shall be valid, to all
intents and purposes, as part of the Constitution, when ratified
by the legislatures of three fourths of the States, or by
conventions in three fourths thereof." The words of this article
are peremptory. The Congress "shall call a convention."
Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of that
body. And of consequence, all the declamation about the
disinclination to a change vanishes in air. Nor however
difficult it may be supposed to unite two thirds or three
fourths of the State legislatures, in amendments which may
affect local interests, can there be any room to apprehend any
such difficulty in a union on points which are merely relative
to the general liberty or security of the people. We may safely
rely on the disposition of the State legislatures to erect
barriers against the encroachments of the national authority.
If the foregoing argument is a fallacy, certain
it is that I am myself deceived by it, for it is, in my
conception, one of those rare instances in which a political
truth can be brought to the test of a mathematical
demonstration. Those who see the matter in the same light with
me, however zealous they may be for amendments, must agree in
the propriety of a previous adoption, as the most direct road to
their own object.
The zeal for attempts to amend, prior to the
establishment of the Constitution, must abate in every man who
is ready to accede to the truth of the following observations of
a writer equally solid and ingenious: "To balance a large state
or society [says he], whether monarchical or republican, on
general laws, is a work of so great difficulty, that no human
genius, however comprehensive, is able, by the mere dint of
reason and reflection, to effect it. The judgments of many must
unite in the work; EXPERIENCE must guide
their labor; TIME must bring it to
perfection, and the FEELING of
inconveniences must correct the mistakes which they
inevitably fall into in their first trials and experiments."3
These judicious reflections contain a lesson of moderation to
all the sincere lovers of the Union, and ought to put them upon
their guard against hazarding anarchy, civil war, a perpetual
alienation of the States from each other, and perhaps the
military despotism of a victorious demagogue, in the pursuit of
what they are not likely to obtain, but from
TIME and EXPERIENCE. It may be in
me a defect of political fortitude, but I acknowledge that I
cannot entertain an equal tranquillity with those who affect to
treat the dangers of a longer continuance in our present
situation as imaginary. A NATION, without
a NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, is, in my view, an
awful spectacle. The establishment of a Constitution, in time of
profound peace, by the voluntary ocnsent of a whole people, is a
PRODIGY, to the completion of which I
look forward with trembling anxiety. I can reconcile it to no
rules of prudence to let go the hold we now have, in so arduous
an enterprise, upon seven out of the thirteen States, and after
having passed over so considerable a part of the ground, to
recommence the course. I dread the more the consequences of new
attempts, because I know that POWERFUL
INDIVIDUALS, in this and in other States, are enemies to
a general national government in every possible shape.
PUBLIUS
1. Entitled "An Address to the
People of the State of New York."
2. It may rather be said
TEN, for though two thirds may set on
foot the measure, three fourths must ratify.
3. Hume's Essays, Vol. I,
p. 128: "The Rise of Arts and Sciences."
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