
The Federalist No. 9
The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction
and Insurrection
Independent Journal
Wednesday, November 21, 1787
[Alexander Hamilton]
To the People of the State of New York:
A FIRM
Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the
States, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection. It
is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece
and Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the
distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the
rapid succession of revolutions by which they were kept in a state
of perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy.
If they exhibit occasional calms, these only serve as short-lived
contrast to the furious storms that are to succeed. If now and then
intervals of felicity open to view, we behold them with a mixture of
regret, arising from the reflection that the pleasing scenes before
us are soon to be overwhelmed by the tempestuous waves of sedition
and party rage. If momentary rays of glory break forth from the
gloom, while they dazzle us with a transient and fleeting
brilliancy, they at the same time admonish us to lament that the
vices of government should pervert the direction and tarnish the
lustre of those bright talents and exalted endowments for which the
favored soils that produced them have been so justly celebrated.
From the disorders that disfigure the annals of
those republics the advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not
only against the forms of republican government, but against the
very principles of civil liberty. They have decried all free
government as inconsistent with the order of society, and have
indulged themselves in malicious exultation over its friends and
partisans. Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics reared on the
basis of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have, in a few
glorious instances, refuted their gloomy sophisms. And, I trust,
America will be the broad and solid foundation of other edifices,
not less magnificent, which will be equally permanent monuments of
their errors.
But it is not to be denied that the portraits they
have sketched of republican government were too just copies of the
originals from which they were taken. If it had been found
impracticable to have devised models of a more perfect structure,
the enlightened friends to liberty would have been obliged to
abandon the cause of that species of government as indefensible. The
science of politics, however, like most other sciences, has received
great improvement. The efficacy of various principles is now well
understood, which were either not known at all, or imperfectly known
to the ancients. The regular distribution of power into distinct
departments; the introduction of legislative balances and checks;
the institution of courts composed of judges holding their offices
during good behavior; the representation of the people in the
legislature by deputies of their own election: these are wholly new
discoveries, or have made their principal progress towards
perfection in modern times. They are means, and powerful means, by
which the excellences of republican government may be retained and
its imperfections lessened or avoided. To this catalogue of
circumstances that tend to the amelioration of popular systems of
civil government, I shall venture, however novel it may appear to
some, to add one more, on a principle which has been made the
foundation of an objection to the new Constitution; I mean the
ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT
within which such systems are to revolve, either in respect to the
dimensions of a single State or to the consolidation of several
smaller States into one great Confederacy. The latter is that which
immediately concerns the object under consideration. It will,
however, be of use to examine the principle in its application to a
single State, which shall be attended to in another place.
The utility of a Confederacy, as well to suppress
faction and to guard the internal tranquillity of States, as to
increase their external force and security, is in reality not a new
idea. It has been practiced upon in different countries and ages,
and has received the sanction of the most approved writers on the
subject of politics. The opponents of the plan proposed have, with
great assiduity, cited and circulated the observations of
Montesquieu on the necessity of a contracted territory for a
republican government. But they seem not to have been apprised of
the sentiments of that great man expressed in another part of his
work, nor to have adverted to the consequences of the principle to
which they subscribe with such ready acquiescence.
When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for
republics, the standards he had in view were of dimensions far short
of the limits of almost every one of these States. Neither Virginia,
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, nor Georgia
can by any means be compared with the models from which he reasoned
and to which the terms of his description apply. If we therefore
take his ideas on this point as the criterion of truth, we shall be
driven to the alternative either of taking refuge at once in the
arms of monarchy, or of splitting ourselves into an infinity of
little, jealous, clashing, tumultuous commonwealths, the wretched
nurseries of unceasing discord, and the miserable objects of
universal pity or contempt. Some of the writers who have come
forward on the other side of the question seem to have been aware of
the dilemma; and have even been bold enough to hint at the division
of the larger States as a desirable thing. Such an infatuated
policy, such a desperate expedient, might, by the multiplication of
petty offices, answer the views of men who possess not
qualifications to extend their influence beyond the narrow circles
of personal intrigue, but it could never promote the greatness or
happiness of the people of America.
Referring the examination of the principle itself to
another place, as has been already mentioned, it will be sufficient
to remark here that, in the sense of the author who has been most
emphatically quoted upon the occasion, it would only dictate a
reduction of the SIZE of the more
considerable MEMBERS of the Union, but would
not militate against their being all comprehended in one confederate
government. And this is the true question, in the discussion of
which we are at present interested.
So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from
standing in opposition to a general Union of the States, that he
explicitly treats of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC
as the expedient for extending the sphere of popular government, and
reconciling the advantages of monarchy with those of republicanism.
"It is very probable," (says he1)
"that mankind would have been obliged at length to live constantly
under the government of a SINGLE PERSON, had
they not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the internal
advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a
monarchical government. I mean a CONFEDERATE
REPUBLIC.
"This form of government is a convention by which
several smaller states agree to become members of a larger
one, which they intend to form. It is a kind of assemblage of
societies that constitute a new one, capable of increasing, by means
of new associations, till they arrive to such a degree of power as
to be able to provide for the security of the united body.
"A republic of this kind, able to withstand an
external force, may support itself without any internal corruptions.
The form of this society prevents all manner of inconveniences.
"If a single member should attempt to usurp the
supreme authority, he could not be supposed to have an equal
authority and credit in all the confederate states. Were he to have
too great influence over one, this would alarm the rest. Were he to
subdue a part, that which would still remain free might oppose him
with forces independent of those which he had usurped and overpower
him before he could be settled in his usurpation.
"Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the
confederate states the others are able to quell it. Should abuses
creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound.
The state may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the
confederacy may be dissolved, and the confederates preserve their
sovereignty.
"As this government is composed of small republics,
it enjoys the internal happiness of each; and with respect to its
external situation, it is possessed, by means of the association, of
all the advantages of large monarchies.
I have thought it proper to quote at length these
interesting passages, because they contain a luminous abridgment of
the principal arguments in favor of the Union, and must effectually
remove the false impressions which a misapplication of other parts
of the work was calculated to make. They have, at the same time, an
intimate connection with the more immediate design of this paper;
which is, to illustrate the tendency of the Union to repress
domestic faction and insurrection.
A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been
raised between a confederacy and a consolidation of
the States. The essential characteristic of the first is said to be,
the restriction of its authority to the members in their collective
capacities, without reaching to the individuals of whom they are
composed. It is contended that the national council ought to have no
concern with any object of internal administration. An exact
equality of suffrage between the members has also been insisted upon
as a leading feature of a confederate government. These positions
are, in the main, arbitrary; they are supported neither by principle
nor precedent. It has indeed happened, that governments of this kind
have generally operated in the manner which the distinction taken
notice of, supposes to be inherent in their nature; but there have
been in most of them extensive exceptions to the practice, which
serve to prove, as far as example will go, that there is no absolute
rule on the subject. And it will be clearly shown in the course of
this investigation that as far as the principle contended for has
prevailed, it has been the cause of incurable disorder and
imbecility in the government.
The definition of a confederate republic
seems simply to be "an assemblage of societies," or an association
of two or more states into one state. The extent, modifications, and
objects of the federal authority are mere matters of discretion. So
long as the separate organization of the members be not abolished;
so long as it exists, by a constitutional necessity, for local
purposes; though it should be in perfect subordination to the
general authority of the union, it would still be, in fact and in
theory, an association of states, or a confederacy. The proposed
Constitution, so far from implying an abolition of the State
governments, makes them constituent parts of the national
sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in the Senate,
and leaves in their possession certain exclusive and very important
portions of sovereign power. This fully corresponds, in every
rational import of the terms, with the idea of a federal government.
In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of
twenty-three CITIES or republics, the largest
were entitled to three votes in the COMMON
COUNCIL, those of the middle class to two, and the
smallest to one. The COMMON COUNCIL
had the appointment of all the judges and magistrates of the
respective CITIES. This was certainly the
most, delicate species of interference in their internal
administration; for if there be any thing that seems exclusively
appropriated to the local jurisdictions, it is the appointment of
their own officers. Yet Montesquieu, speaking of this association,
says: "Were I to give a model of an excellent Confederate Republic,
it would be that of Lycia." Thus we perceive that the distinctions
insisted upon were not within the contemplation of this enlightened
civilian; and we shall be led to conclude, that they are the novel
refinements of an erroneous theory.
PUBLIUS
1. Spirit of Laws, Vol. I.,
Book IX., Chap. I.
|