South Carolina's Exposition
and Protest Against the Tariff of 1828 |
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John C. Calhoun
(Anonymously) |
As John C. Calhoun was Vice President in 1828, he could not
openly oppose actions of the Jackson administration. Yet he was
moving more and more toward the states' rights position which in
1832 would lead to the nullification crisis. He drafted this protest
against the Tariff of 1828, the so-called "Tariff of Abominations."
The committee [of the South Carolina Legislature] have bestowed on
the subjects referred to them the deliberate attention which their
importance demands; and the result, on full investigation, is a
unanimous opinion that the act of Congress of the last session, with
the whole system of legislation imposing duties on imports, not for
revenue, but the protection of one branch of industry at the expense
of others, is unconstitutional, unequal, and oppressive, and
calculated to corrupt the public virtue and destroy the liberty of
the country; which propositions they propose to consider in the
order stated, and then to conclude their report with the
consideration of the important question of the remedy.
The committee do not propose to enter into an elaborate or refined
argument on the question of the constitutionality of the Tariff
system. The General Government is one of specific powers, and it can
rightfully exercise only the powers expressly granted, and those
that may be necessary and proper to carry them into effect, all
others being reserved expressly to the States or the people. It
results, necessarily, that those who claim to exercise power under
the Constitution, are bound to show that it is expressly granted, or
that it is necessary and proper as a means of the granted powers.
The advocates of the Tariff have offered no such proof. It is true
that the third section of the first article of the Constitution
authorizes Congress to lay and collect an impost duty, but it is
granted as a tax power for the sole purpose of revenue, a power in
its nature essentially different from that of imposing protective or
prohibitory duties. Their objects are incompatible. The prohibitory
system must end in destroying the revenue from imports. It has been
said that the system is a violation of the spirit, and not the
letter of the Constitution. The distinction is not material. The
Constitution may be as grossly violated by acting against its
meaning as against its letter; but it may be proper to dwell a
moment on the point in order to understand more fully the real
character of the acts under which the interest of this, and other
States similarly situated, has been sacrificed. The facts are few
and simple. The Constitution grants to Congress the power of
imposing a duty on imports for revenue, which power is abused by
being converted into an instrument of rearing up the industry of one
section of the country on the ruins of another. The violation, then,
consists in using a power granted for one object to advance another,
and that by the sacrifice of the original object. It is, in a word,
a violation by perversion, the most dangerous of all because the
most insidious and difficult to resist. Others cannot be perpetrated
without the aid of the judiciary; this may be by the Executive and
Legislative departments alone. The courts cannot look into the
motives of legislators. They are obliged to take acts by their
titles and professed objects, and if these be constitutional, they
cannot interpose their power, however grossly the acts may, in
reality, violate the Constitution. The proceedings of the last
session sufficiently prove that the House of Representatives are
aware of the distinction, and determined to avail themselves of its
advantage. . . .
On entering on this branch of the subject [the inequality and
oppression of the Tariff system], the committee feel the painful
character of the duty which they must perform. They would desire
never to speak of our country, as far as the action of the General
Government is concerned, but as one great whole, having a common
interest, which all the parts ought zealously to promote. Previously
to the adoption of the Tariff system, such was the unanimous feeling
of this State; but in speaking of its operation, it will be
impossible to avoid the discussion of sectional interest, and the
use of sectional language. On its authors, and not on us, who are
compelled to adopt this course in self-defence, by injustice and
oppression, be the censure.
So partial are the effects of the system, that its burdens are
exclusively on one side and its benefits on the other. It imposes on
the agricultural interest of the South, including the Southwest, and
that portion of the country particularly engaged in commerce and
navigation, the burden not only of sustaining the system itself, but
that also of the Government. In stating the case thus strongly, it
is not the intention of the committee to exaggerate. If exaggeration
were not unworthy of the gravity of the subject, the reality is such
as to make it unnecessary....
We are the serfs of the system, out of whose labor is raised, not
only the money paid into the Treasury, but the funds out of which
are drawn the rich rewards of the manufacturer and his associates in
interest. Their encouragement is our discouragement. The duty on
imports, which is mainly paid out of our labor, gives them the means
of selling to us at a higher price; while we cannot, to compensate
the loss, dispose of our products at the least advance. It is then,
indeed, not a subject of wonder, when understood, that our section
of the country, though helped by a kind Providence with a genial sun
and prolific soil, from which spring the richest products, should
languish in poverty and sink into decay, while the rest of the
Union, though less fortunate in natural advantages, are flourishing
in unexampled prosperity. The assertion, that the encouragement of
the industry of the manufacturing States is, in fact, discouragement
to ours, was not made without due deliberation. It is susceptible of
the clearest proof. We cultivate certain great staples for the
supply of the general market of the world: They manufacture almost
exclusively for the home market. Their object in the Tariff is to
keep down foreign competition, in order to obtain a monopoly of the
domestic market. The effect on us is, to compel us to purchase at a
higher price, both what we obtain from them and from others, without
receiving a correspondent increase in the price of what we sell. The
price at which we can afford to cultivate must depend on the price
at which we receive our supplies. The lower the latter, the lower we
may dispose of our products with profit, and in the same degree our
capacity of meeting competition is increased; and, on the contrary,
the higher the price of our supplies, the less the profit, and the
less, consequently, the capacity for meeting competition. . . . The
case, then, fairly stated between us and the manufacturing States
is, that the Tariff gives them a protection against foreign
competition in our own market, by diminishing, in the same
proportion, our capacity to compete with our rivals, in the general
market of the world. They who say that they cannot compete with
foreigners at their own doors, without an advantage of 45 per cent,
expect us to meet them abroad under disadvantage equal to their
encouragement. But this oppression, as great as it is, will not stop
at this point. The trade between us and Europe has, heretofore, been
a mutual exchange of products. Under the existing duties, the
consumption of European fabrics must, in a great measure, cease in
our country and the trade must become, on their part, a cash
transaction. He must be ignorant of the principles of commerce, and
the policy of Europe, particularly England, who does not see that it
is impossible to carry on a trade of such vast extent on any other
basis than barter; and that, if it were not so carried on, it would
not long be tolerated. We already see indications of the
commencement of a commercial warfare, the termination of which no
one can conjecture, though our fate may easily be. The last remains
of our great and once flourishing agriculture must be annihilated in
the conflict. In the first instance, we will be thrown on the home
market, which cannot consume a fourth of our products; and instead
of supplying the world, as we would with a free trade, we would be
compelled to abandon the cultivation of three fourths of what we now
raise, and receive for the residue, whatever the manufacturers, who
would then have their policy consummated by the entire possession of
our market, might choose to give. Forced to abandon our ancient and
favorite pursuit, to which our soil, climate, habits, and peculiar
labor are adapted, at an immense sacrifice of property, we would be
compelled, without capital, experience, or skill, and with a
population untried in such pursuits, to attempt to become the rivals
instead of the customers of the manufacturing States. The result is
not doubtful. If they, by superior capital and skill, should keep
down successful competition on our part, we would be doomed to toil
at our unprofitable agriculture, selling at the prices which a
single and very limited market might give. But, on the contrary, if
our necessity should triumph over their capital and skill, if,
instead of raw cotton, we should ship to the manufacturing States
cotton yarn and cotton goods, the thoughtful must see that it would
inevitably bring about a state of things which could not long
continue. Those who now make war on our gains, would then make it on
our labor. They would not tolerate, that those, who now cultivate
our plantations, and furnish them with the material, and the market
for the products of their arts, should, by becoming their rivals,
take bread out of the mouths of their wives and children. The
committee will not pursue this painful subject; but, as they clearly
see that the system, if not arrested, must bring the country to this
hazardous extremity, neither prudence nor patriotism would permit
them to pass it by without raising a warning voice against a dander
of such menacing character….
The committee having presented its views on the partial and
oppressive operation of the system, will proceed to discuss the next
position which they proposed, its tendency to corrupt the
Government, and to destroy the liberty of the country.
If there be a political proposition universally true, one which
springs directly from the nature of man, and is independent of
circumstances, it is, that irresponsible power is inconsistent with
liberty, and must corrupt those who exercise it. On this great
principle our political system rests. We consider all powers as
delegated by the people, and to be controlled by them, who are
interested in their just and proper exercise; and our Governments,
both State and General, are but a system of judicious contrivances
to bring this fundamental principle into fair, practical operation.
Among the most prominent of these is, the responsibility of
representatives to their constituents, through frequent periodical
elections, in order to enforce a faithful performance of their
delegated trust. Without such a check on their powers, however
clearly they may be defined and distinctly prescribed, our liberty
would be but a mockery. The Government, instead of being directed to
the general good, would speedily become but the instrument to
aggrandize those who might be intrusted with its administration. On
the other hand, if laws were uniform in their operation, if that
which imposed a burden on one, imposed it likewise on all or that
which acted beneficially for one, acted also, in the same manner,
for all the responsibility of representatives to their constituents
would alone be sufficient to guard against abuse and tyranny
provided the people be sufficiently intelligent to understand their
interest, and the motives and conduct of their public agents. But,
if it be supposed that, from diversity of interests in the several
classes and sections of the country, the laws act differently, so
that the same law, though couched in general terms and apparently
fair, shall, in reality, transfer the power and property of one
class or section to another, in such case, responsibility to
constituents, which is but the means of enforcing fidelity of
representatives to them, must prove wholly insufficient to preserve
the purity of public agents, or the liberty of the country. It
would, in fact, fall short of the evil. The disease would be in the
community itself, in the constituents, and not their
representatives. The opposing interests of the community would
engender, necessarily, opposing, hostile parties, organized on this
very diversity of interests, the stronger of which, if the
Government provided no efficient check, would exercise unlimited and
unrestrained power over the weaker. The relation of equality between
the parts of the community, established by the Constitution, would
be destroyed, and in its place there would be substituted the
relation of sovereign and subject, between the stronger and weaker
interests, in its most odious and oppressive form. . . . The
committee has labored to little purpose, if they have not
demonstrated that the very case . . . does not now exist in our
country, under the name of the American System and which, if not
timely arrested, must be followed by all the consequences which
never fail to spring from the exercise of irresponsible power. On
the great and vital point-the industry of the country-which
comprehends almost every interest-the interest of the two great
sections is opposed. We want free trade, they restrictions; we want
moderate taxes, frugality in the Government, economy,
accountability, and a rigid application of the public money to the
payment of the debt, and to the objects authorized by the
Constitution. In all these particulars, if we may judge by
experience, their views of their interest are precisely the
opposite. They feel and act, on all questions connected with the
American System, as sovereigns, as men invariably do who impose
burdens on others for their own benefit; and we, on the other band,
like those on whom such burdens are imposed. In a word, to the
extent stated, the country is divided and organized into two great
parties the one sovereign and the other subject-bearing towards each
other all the attributes which must ever accompany that relation,
under whatever form it may exist. . . .
The committee has demonstrated that the present disordered state of
our political system originated in the diversity of interests which
exists in the country; a diversity recognized by the Constitution
itself, and to which it owes one of its most distinguished and
peculiar features, the division of the delegated powers between the
State and General Governments. Our short experience, before the
formation of the present Government, had conclusively shown that,
while there were powers which in their nature were local and
peculiar, and which could not be exercised by all, without
oppression to some of the parts, so, also, there were those which,
in their operation, necessarily affected the whole, and could not,
therefore, be exercised by any of the parts, without affecting
injuriously the others. On this different character, by which powers
are distinguished in their geographical operation, our political
system was constructed. Viewed in relation to them, to a certain
extent we have a community of interests, which can only be justly
and fairly supervised by concentrating the will and authority of the
several States in the General Government; while, at the same time,
the States have distinct and separate interests, over which no
supervision can be exercised by the general power without injustice
and oppression. Hence the division in the exercise of sovereign
powers. In drawing the line between the powers of the two-the
General and State Governments-the great difficulty consisted in
determining correctly to which of the two the various political
powers ought to belong. This difficult task was, however, performed
with so much success that, to this day, there is an almost entire
acquiescence in the correctness with which the line was drawn. It
would be extraordinary if a system, thus resting with such profound
wisdom on the diversity of geographical interests among the States,
should make no provision against the dangers to which its very basis
might be exposed. The framers of our Constitution have not exposed
themselves to the imputation of such weakness. When their work is
fairly examined, it will be found that they have provided, with
admirable skill, the most effective remedy; and that, if it has not
prevented the danger with which the system is now threatened, the
fault is not theirs, but ours, in neglecting to make its proper
application. In the primary division of the sovereign powers, and in
their exact and just classification, as stated, are to be found the
first provisions or checks against the abuse of authority on the
part of the absolute majority. The powers of the General Government
are particularly enumerated and specifically delegated; and all
powers not expressly delegated, or which are not necessary and
proper to carry into effect those that are so granted, are reserved
expressly to the States or the people. The Government is thus
positively restricted to the exercise of those general powers that
were supposed to act uniformly on all the parts, leaving, the
residue to the people of the States, by whom alone, from the very
nature of these powers, they can be justly and fairly exercised, as
has been stated.
Our system, then, consists of two distinct and independent
Governments. The general powers, expressly delegated to the General
Government, are subject to its sole and separate control; and the
States cannot, without violating the constitutional compact,
interpose their authority to check, or in any manner to counteract
its movements, so long as they are confined to the proper sphere.
So, also, the peculiar and local powers reserved to the States are
subject to their exclusive control; nor can the General Government
interfere, in any manner, with them, without violating the
Constitution.
In order to have a full and clear conception of our institutions, it
will be proper to remark that there is, in our system, a striking
distinction between Government and Sovereignty. The separate
governments of the several States are vested in their Legislative,
Executive, and judicial Departments; while the sovereignty resides
in the people of the States respectively. The powers of the General
Government are also vested in its Legislative, Executive, and
judicial Departments, while the sovereignty resides in the people of
the several States who created it, But, by an express provision of
the Constitution, it may be amended or changed by three fourths of
the States; and thus each State, by assenting to the Constitution
with this provision, has modified its original right as a sovereign,
of making its individual consent necessary to any change in its
political condition; and, by becoming a member of the Union, has
placed this important power in the hands of three fourths of the
States, -in whom the highest power known to the Constitution
actually resides. Not the least portion of this high sovereign
authority resides in Congress, or any of the departments of the
General Government. They are but the creatures of the Constitution,
and are appointed but to execute its provisions; and, therefore, any
attempt by all, or any of these departments, to exercise any power
which, in its consequences, may alter the nature of the instrument,
or change the condition of the parties to it, would be an act of
usurpation. . . .
If it be conceded, as it must be by every one who is the least
conversant with our institutions, that the sovereign powers
delegated are divided between the General and State Governments, and
that the latter bold their portion by the same tenure as the former,
it would seem impossible to deny to the States the right of deciding
on the infractions of their powers, and the proper remedy to be
applied for their correction. The right of judging, in such cases,
is an essential attribute of sovereignty, of which the States cannot
be divested without losing their sovereignty itself, and being
reduced to a subordinate corporate condition. In fact, to divide
power, and to give to one of the parties the exclusive right of
judging of the portion allotted to each, is, in reality, not to
divide it at all; and to reserve such exclusive right to the General
Government (it matters not by what department to be exercised, is to
convert it, in fact, into a great consolidated government, with
unlimited powers, and to divest the States, in reality, of all their
rights, It is impossible to understand the force of terms, and to
deny so plain a conclusion. The opposite opinion can be embraced
only on hasty and imperfect views of the relation existing between
the States and the General Government. But the existence of the
right of judging of their powers, so clearly established from the
sovereignty of States, as clearly implies a veto or control, within
its limits, on the action of the General Government, on contested
points of authority; and this very control is the remedy which the
Constitution has provided to prevent the encroachments of the
General Government on the reserved rights of the States; and by
which the distribution of power, between the General and State
Governments, may be preserved for ever inviolable, on the basis
established by the Constitution. It is thus effectual protection is
afforded to the minority, against the oppression of the majority....
It is thus that our system has provided appropriate checks between
the Departments, a veto to guard the supremacy of the Constitution
over the laws, and to preserve the due importance of the States,
considered in reference to large and small, without creating discord
or %weakening the beneficent energy of the Government. And so, also,
in the division of the sovereign authority between the General and
State Governments, by leaving to the States an efficient power to
protect, by a veto, the minor against the major interests of the
community, the framers of the Constitution acted in strict
conformity with the principle which invariably prevails throughout
the whole system, where separate interests exist. They were, in
truth, no ordinary men. They were wise and practical statesmen,
enlightened by history and their own enlarged experience, acquired
in conducting our country through a most important revolution; and
understood profoundly the nature of man and of government. They saw
and felt that there existed in our nature the necessity of
government, and government of adequate powers; that the selfish
predominate over the social feelings; and that, without a government
of such powers, universal conflict and anarchy must prevail among
the component parts of society; but they also clearly saw that, our
nature remaining unchanged by change of condition, unchecked power,
from this very predominance of the selfish over the social feelings,
which rendered government necessary, would, of necessity, lead to
corruption and oppression on the part of those vested with its
exercise. Thus the necessity of government and of checks originates
in the same great principle of our nature; and thus the very
selfishness which impels those who have power to desire more, will
also, with equal force, impel those on whom power operates to resist
aggression; and on the balance of these opposing tendencies, liberty
and happiness must for ever depend. This great principle guided in
the formation of every part of our political system. There is not
one opposing interest throughout the whole that is not
counterpoised. Have the rulers a separate interest from the people?
To check its abuse, the relation of representative and constituent
is created between them, through periodical elections, by which the
fidelity of the representative to the constituent is secured. Have
the States, as members of the Union, distinct political interests in
reference to their magnitude? Their relative weight is carefully
settled, and each has its appropriate agent, with a veto on each
other, to protect its political consequence. May there be a conflict
between the Constitution and the laws, whereby the rights of
citizens may be affected? A remedy may be found in the power of the
courts to declare the law unconstitutional in such cases as may be
brought before them. Are there, among the several States, separate
and peculiar geographical interests? To meet this, a particular
organization is provided in the division of the sovereign powers
between the State and General Governments. Is there danger, growing
out of this division, that the State Legislatures may encroach on
the powers of the General Government? The authority of the Supreme
Court is adequate to check such encroachments. May the General
Government, on the other hand, encroach on the rights reserved to
the States respectively? To the States respectively each in its
sovereign capacity is reserved the power, by its veto, or right of
interposition, to arrest the encroachment. And, finally, may this
power be abused by a State, so as to interfere improperly with the
powers delegated to the General Government? There is provided a
power, even over the Constitution itself, vested in three fourths of
the States, which Congress has the authority to invoke, and may
terminate all controversies in reference to the subject, by granting
or withholding the right in contest. Its authority is acknowledged
by all; and to deny or resist it, would be, on the part of the
State, a violation of the constitutional compact, and a dissolution
of the political association, as far as it is concerned. This is the
ultimate and highest power, and the basis on which the whole system
rests. . . .
With these views the committee are solemnly of the impression, if
the present usurpations and the professed doctrines of the existing
system be persevered in, after due forebearance on the part of the
State, that it will be her sacred duty to interposes duty to
herself, to the Union, to the present, and to future generations,
arid to the cause of liberty over the world, to arrest the progress
of a usurpation which, if not arrested, must, in its consequences,
corrupt the public morals and destroy the liberty of the country.